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This dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper "Ethnicity, Migration and Conflict: 
Evidence from Contemporary South Africa” exploits some of the institutional changes intervened in 
South Africa during the end of apartheid to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and 
conflict. I find within-ethnic polarization to be significantly related to the intensity of armed 
confrontations among black-dominated groups. My investigation thus gives strong and robust 
empirical support to the theoretical arguments which identify ethnic diversity as one of the 
determinants of civil conflict. The second chapter, "Pre-Colonial Centralization, Colonial Activities 
and Development in Latin America", investigates the hypothesis that pre-colonial ethnic institutions 
shaped contemporary regional development in Latin America. I document a strong and positive 
relationship between pre-colonial centralization and regional development. Results are in line with 
the view that highly centralized pre-colonial societies acted as a persistent force of agglomeration of 
economic activities and a strong predictor of colonial state capacity. The results provide a first 
evidence of the existence of a link between pre-colonial centralization, colonial institutional 
arrangements and contemporary economic development. The third paper "Bite and Divide: Malaria 
and Ethnic Diversity” investigates the role of malaria as a fundamental determinant of modern 
ethnic diversity. This paper explores the hypothesis, that a large exposure to malaria has fostered 
differential interactions that reduced contacts between groups and increased interactions within 
them Results document that malaria increases the number of ethnic groups at all levels of spatial 
disaggregation and time periods (exploiting historical and current ethnic diversity). Regressions' 
results show that endogamous marriages are more frequent in areas with higher geographic 
suitability to malaria. The results are in line with the view that malaria increases intra-ethnic 
interactions while decreasing inter-ethnic ones. 
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Abstract
This paper explores the extent to which changes over time in ethnic distribu-
tion correlate with contemporaneous changes in conflict incidence. We focus
on the history of contemporary South Africa. Migration flows following the im-
plementation and repeal of apartheid segregation laws induced cross-sectional
and time variation in districts’ ethnic composition. Ethnolinguistic diversity
within the black majority is shown to be strongly informative of the incidence
of armed confrontations between black-dominated organized groups. In order
to achieve identification, we compare the evolution of conflict across districts
experiencing differential changes in ethnic composition. Results are robust
when comparing neighboring localities, and to the implementation of an in-
strumental variable strategy where pairwise distance between districts is used
to predict the location decision of internal migrants.
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1 Introduction
Civil war is closely related with poor economic performance. Understanding its determinants
is regarded as crucial in the challenge for world development (Blattman and Miguel 2010).
Conflict commonly manifests itself through ethnic markers. Ethnic traits stand out as a salient
technology for either or both the generation and expression of social tensions. Indeed, the
empirical evidence shows the probability of conflict outbreak and conflict incidence to be strongly
correlated with measures of historical ethnic distribution (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005,
2010; Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Wacziarg 2012; Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012). However,
it is still unknown whether migration flows involving ethnically diverse communities have any
impact on conflict prevalence. In this paper, we study the extent to which changes over time in
ethnic distribution correlate with contemporaneous changes in conflict incidence.
We focus on the history of contemporary South Africa. Starting in the 1950s, apartheid segrega-
tion laws regulated the ethnic composition of local districts. The repeal of apartheid legislation
in the early 1990s restored free internal mobility of blacks within the country while democrati-
zation in 1994 ended the white minority rule in favor of the newly enfranchised black majority.
Throughout this period, black-dominated parties and unions were struggling violently amongst
themselves to benefit from the transition and dominate the new institutional scenario. Figure
1a plots the total number of armed confrontations between organized groups recorded in South
Africa from 1989 to 2004. Non-state conflict events refer to struggles between black-dominated
groups, while one-side conflict events are those in which the Government is involved.1 Violence
between black groups reached its peak in 1993, with almost 500 confrontations recorded in the
country as a whole. It then decreased sharply after democratization in 1994, and died out
almost completely since 2000. By the same token, Figure 1b is taken from Reed (2013) and
plots the internal migration rates in South Africa from 1955 to 1999.2 The number of moves
per person-year spiked in 1991, the same year the last legal impediment to mobility (the Group
Areas Act) was repealed. Migration rates remained as high as 9% in the years to follow. In this
paper, we link these two facts in studying the relationship between ethnicity and conflict. In
particular, we explore the extent to which the struggle between black organized groups over the
period manifested itself through ethnic markers. Indeed, we relate migration-driven changes
in local districts’ ethnic composition to the concurrent changes in conflict incidence and find
the number of conflict events to be positively correlated with contemporaneous measures of
within-black ethnolinguistic polarization.3
[Figure 1]
1Source: Geo-referenced Event Dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP-GED v1.5), Department
of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. The data are described in details in the Data section.
2Source: South Africa Migration and Health Survey (SAMHS)
3We use the polarization index used in Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 2010),
which falls within the class of measures proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). The index formula is presented
and discussed in Section 4.
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Several theoretical contributions in the literature explore the relationship between ethnic diver-
sity and conflict. Horowitz (1985) first noticed that conflicts seem to arise in societies where
a large ethnic minority faces another ethnic majority.4 Modeling social confrontation and its
relationship with measures of heterogeneity in general, Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) argue that
polarized societies, characterized by internally homogeneous but externally very distant groups,
are more prone to experience conflict. In the specific case of ethnicity, ethnic lines may become
salient in conflict as they allow for separation of individuals into groups that are homogenous
under one trait (ethnicity), but significantly different in their economic characteristics. Indeed,
Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011a) explore the role of intra-group synergies in conflict effort that
arise when ethnic groups are characterized by high within-group economic inequality. Caselli
and Coleman (2013) rationalize instead the salience of ethnic trait in conflicts framing it as a
technological device which prevents indiscriminate access to the expected gains of the winning
group. Finally, Esteban and Ray (2011b) develop an extensive theory of conflict which high-
lights the role of different distribution measures. Indeed, together with Esteban, Mayoral, and
Ray (2012), they show both theoretically and empirically the informativeness of the polarization
measure with regard to conflict severity to be positively related to the degree of publicness of
the disputed prize. We conceptualize the struggle within the black majority in South Africa
through the end of apartheid as a dispute for political power in the new institutional scenario,
both at the local and national level. Such prize is intrinsically public in nature. We thus refer to
these last contributions as the theoretical foundation for our focus on the polarization measure.5
For the purpose of this paper, we combine geo-referenced information on conflict with South
Africa Census data. As a preliminary analysis, we exploit cross-district variation in ethnic com-
position before the fall of apartheid in 1991 and find a positive correlation between ethnolin-
guistic polarization within the black majority and the number of recorded armed confrontations
between black-dominated organized groups. As a first contribution of this paper, and despite
their primarily political nature, we thus provide a qualification of these conflicts as expressed
through ethnic markers. Then, we exploit the most distinguished feature of this setting: time
variation in the ethnic distribution at the local district level. Mainly driven by the migration
flows following the repeal of apartheid segregation laws, substantial time variation allows us
to combine data from 1991 and 1996 and show the change in polarization at the district level
to be positively strongly and significantly correlated with the change in the number of conflict
events per year. We implement a first-difference specification which rules out unobserved differ-
ences in time-invariant determinants of conflict incidence across districts. The point estimate
of the coefficient of interest is stable across specifications. Evidence suggests an increase in the
within-black polarization index of one cross-district standard deviation to be associated with
an increase in the number of conflict events per district of more than the 1991 national average.
Moreover, conditioning on the total number of conflict events in 1989-1990 still yields highly
significant results.
4Collier (2001) and Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) further develop and empirically test this hypothesis. Horowitz
himself extensively studied South Africa as a case study of a society divided along ethnic lines.
5For an overview of the debate over the use of alternative ethnolinguistic distribution measures in the empirical
analysis see also Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and
Weber (2009).
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The relationship we find using a first-difference approach can potentially be driven by unob-
served factors which affect the evolution of both ethnic composition and conflict in the same
way, generating a spurious correlation between the two. For example, unobserved geographic
characteristics may be correlated with both changes in ethnic diversity and the evolution of
conflict (Michalopoulos 2012). We examine the severity of this issue by looking at the rela-
tionship of interest within clusters of neighboring districts. In the spirit of matching methods,
we control for common trends at the cluster level. We thus exploit only residual variability in
both within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and conflict incidence and still find evidence of a
positive relationship between the two. Finally, we specifically focus on internal migration as the
main source of variability for the change in districts’ ethnic composition. Individuals’ migration
choice and location decision may potentially be endogenous to the evolution of conflict. In the
presence of more than two groups, mapping the outcomes of individual decision problems into
systematic changes in the polarization index is theoretically challenging.6 We thus implement
an instrumental variable strategy where we use pairwise distance between districts to predict
the location decision of internal migrants. This because, once the migration decision is taken,
distance from the origin is a strong determinant of ultimate location choice (Kok, O’Donovan,
Bouare, and Van Zyl 2003). In a simulation exercise, we use distance-based predicted location
probabilities to re-allocate an exogenously given fraction of migrants from each ethnolinguistic
group from each district to the rest of South Africa, independently from conflict levels and
changes. The resulting predicted change in the district-level polarization index is thus used as
instrument for the actual one, ruling out identification threats from both endogenous location
decisions of internal migrants and other sources of changes in ethnic distribution, such as disease
prevalence. 2SLS point estimates are higher than previous ones, highlighting the role played by
internal migration and confirming the existence of a strong link between within-black ethnolin-
guistic polarization and number of violent confrontations between black-dominated organized
groups.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature studying relationship between ethnic polar-
ization and conflict incidence. Such exploration was first carried out by Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005). More recently, Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Wacziarg (2012) investigate the
explanatory power of diversity measures as computed at different levels of the ethnolinguistic
world tree. Most of the existing studies exploit variation at the cross-country level and make
use of time-invariant distribution indices, drawn from historical and encyclopedic sources of
ethnic diversity.7 One contribution of this paper is that we employ contemporaneous ethnolin-
guistic group populations from Census data in the computation of our time-varying index of
ethnic polarization at the local district level. In particular, we draw information from South
Africa Censuses on languages spoken and validate them using the Ethnologue linguistic database
(Lewis 2009).8 We also use information on districts’ socio-economic characteristics, drawn from
6Esteban and Ray (1994) provide a series of examples to intuitively show the absence of a partial order for
increasing polarization. The same arguments prevent establishing even a partial map between migration flows
and changes in the polarization measure.
7One exception is Novta (2013), who studies theoretically and empirically the relationship between municipal-
level ethnic composition and the spread of civil conflict in Bosnia.
8Detailed information about this procedure is available in the data section. Notice that, with this approach,
we trade off the possible drawbacks from the use of potentially endogenous administrative boundaries with
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Census data, in order to show the robustness of results in reduced form.
Finally, we contribute to a growing body of the literature that studies conflict at a more disaggre-
gated level, such as local communities and individuals themselves. Within these, Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2011) use information on spatial distribution of African ethnicities before
colonization and find contemporary civil conflict incidence to be concentrated in the histori-
cal homeland of partitioned ethnicities. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) use individual,
county and district-level data from Uganda to investigate the social and economic consequences
of ethnic conflicts. Dube and Vargas (2013) exploit variation in the international price of several
agricultural commodities and look at the differential effect on violent conflict across municipal-
ities in Colombia. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) look instead into conflict persistence in
Africa having fine geographical grids as units of observation. Finally, Harari and La Ferrara
(2013) study instead the impact of negative climate shocks on conflict incidence using within-
year variation at the local level.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short overview of the history of
contemporary South Africa. Section 3 introduces the relevant concepts, variables and measures,
coupled with the data we use. The empirical strategy and results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical Background: South Africa and the End of Apartheid
Since the end of World War II until 1994, South Africa was ruled under apartheid regime.
Apartheid - meaning apartness in Afrikaans - was a form of government based on physical
separation of blacks and whites achieved through racial discrimination and political disenfran-
chisement of the black majority. Divisions along racial lines were thought to be the fundamental
organizing principle for the allocation of all resources and opportunities, the basis of all spa-
tial demarcation, planning and development and the boundary for all social interactions (Posel
2001). Under apartheid, economic activity was based on the exploitation of black cheap labor
force in order to ensure high returns to white-owned capital investments (Clark and Worger
2011). By the same token, white workers and farmers were given protection from the competi-
tion of their black counterparts.
An extensive legislation implementing racial segregation was put in place after the election of the
National Party (NP) into government in 1948. The Population Registration Act (1950) formal-
ized the racial classification system through identifying four different races living in the South
Africa. Blacks were further classified into native ethnicities on the basis of the first language
they spoke. The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and Bantu Resettlement Act (1954) established
ten black ethnicity-based homeland reserve areas, known as Bantustan: Transkei and Ciskei
(Xhosa ethnicity), Bophuthatswana (Tswana), Venda (Venda), Gazankulu (Tsonga), Lebowa
the advantages of deriving a time-variant measure of ethnic polarization to employ in our analysis at the sub-
national level. The Ethnologue database has been already used as source of ethnolinguistic information in
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Weber (2009),
Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Wacziarg (2012) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012).
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(Sotho), Qwaqwa (Sotho), KwaZulu (Zulu), KaNgwane (Swazi) and KwaNdebele (Sotho). The
long-term objective of the law was to let the homelands become independent territories.9 Polit-
ical separation was achieved with the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959), which
implied the de iure disenfranchisement of blacks from white South Africa. In less than thirty
years, approximately 3.5 million blacks were obliged to move to the homelands the government
assigned to the different ethnolinguistic groups (Clark and Worger 2011). A number of legisla-
tive acts, such as the Group Areas Act, implemented and guaranteed re-settlement of blacks and
influx controls. The Bantustans became densely populated areas with low levels of service de-
livery, infrastructure and employment (Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and Van Zyl 2003). Figure 2
presents the map of Bantustans in South Africa as defined by the apartheid legislation as of 1986.
[Figure 2]
The apartheid system began to collapse in the mid-1980s mainly due to the internal contra-
dictions and conflicting effects of the same implemented policies. Exploitation and control of
black labor force revealed itself as costly and hardly compoundable with the enforcement of
physical separation of races and ethnicities. Moreover, twenty-five countries (USA and UK
among them) set a trade embargo in the late 1980s, following the 1977 UN Resolution 418 on a
mandatory arms embargo. At the same time, opposition parties started to organize. Together
with the black Africa National Congress (ANC) - a multiethnic party established in 1912 - and
the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) founded in 1953, the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP) was formed in 1980s and the multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF) was created
in 1983. Opposition to apartheid was not homogeneous and parties were not cohesive. Black
political parties engaged in conflicts for two main reasons. First, there was no agreement on
how to put an end to the apartheid experience. Second, there was no consensus on how a new
post-apartheid South Africa should be ruled.
Among the others, confrontation between the ANC/UDF and IFP was the harshest. The IFP
was the KwaZulu governing party, drawing support from the traditional Zulu chiefly structures
in the province, and running on a strongly conservative political platform closely aligned with
large business interests in the province (Carver 1996). On the other hand, the basis of support
for both the UDF and ANC was mainly the urban youth and working class, with their political
goal being the establishment of a non-racial unitary state in contrast with traditional chief
power. As a result, the ANC and IFP had divergent views on the future role of Bantustans,
the consequences of international embargoes, and the eradication of local traditional power.
Moreover, the apartheid government took advantage of divisions within the black opposition
in its struggle to retain power. Indeed, the independentist goals of the IFP and its opposition
to ANC were seconded if not supported by the apartheid establishment (Clark and Worger
9Over time, the government granted various degrees of self-government to the Bantustans, ranging from
independent state-nation - as in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei between 1977 and 1981 - to
limited self-government - as in KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane and KwaNdebele.
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2011).10
In the late 1980s, the government decided to repeal the Pass Law and to free ANC leaders like
Nelson Mandela and other black leaders with the aim of freezing the protests and starting to
negotiate. Between 1990 and 1991, the Natives’ Land Act, the Population Registration Act
and the Group Areas Act were repealed and free mobility of blacks within South Africa was
restored. As previously shown in Figure 1b, internal (especially inter-provincial) migration rates
spiked. The relative economic deprivation of Bantustans acted as a centrifugal force. Indeed,
Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and Van Zyl (2003) use data on migrants from the 1996 Census to
show the substantial contribution to migration of former homelands. Moreover, Bouare (2002)
identifies relative GDP as one of the most important determinants of inter-provincial moves,
together with the relative number of reported crimes.11
Negotiations taking place in 1991-1992 were everything but smooth: while Mandela and de
Klerk (NP) were signing official agreements, fightings kept going on. Free elections were held
in 1994, with Mandela becoming the first black president of the Republic of South Africa. The
struggles between black-dominated groups weakened but continued in the following years. A
number of competing explanations have been put forward among both academics and activists:
political competition, ethnic mobilization, underlying social and economic deprivation, and the
role of powerful local leaders who relied on the use of violence in their struggle to retain power.
Carver (1996) argues that the violence after 1994 was motivated by the willingness to eliminate
pockets of support for the minority party in any given area. One example of this would be the
1995 Christmas Day massacre at Shobashobane, in the south east of KwaZulu-Natal. On that
occasion, 19 ANC members were murdered by a group of about 600 Inkatha Freedom Party
members in an attack to an ANC enclave within an almost exclusively pro-IFP territory.
3 The Data: Concepts and Measurement
The database for the analysis is built through combining several different data sources. The fun-
damental geographical unit for the within-country empirical analysis is the Magisterial District
(MD), a sub-provincial territorial unit defined by the judicial system under the administration
of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.12 The map of South Africa in
Figure 3 shows the district boundaries. These are still informed by the pre-1994 demarcations
of the self-governing states and the Republic of South Africa territory. This makes them partic-
ularly valuable as units of comparative analysis on a small-scale geographical basis, as all other
10As shown in the Online Appendix, the fundamental results from our empirical analysis are qualitatively the
same when we control for measures of the intensity of governmental repression.
11It is here worth noticing that existing contributions, like Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and Van Zyl (2003),
use post-migration data from the 1996 Census to derive predictors of former migration decisions between 1991
and 1996. This constitutes a serious limitation to their study. Indeed, the authors themselves argue that their
analysis could not find entirely satisfactory explanations for the observed internal migration trends.
12South Africa is currently divided into 9 provinces and 354 MDs. 298 of these were surveyed in the 1991
Census of the Republic of South Africa, as the remaining ones were part of independent Bantustans.
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administrative divisions have been subject to frequent re-demarcations after democratization
in 1994. Partly because of this, MDs have been used as unit of analysis in the economics and
natural science literature (Case and Deaton 1999; Hoffman and Todd 2000).
[Figure 3]
3.1 Ethnic Polarization
Ethnolinguistic information is drawn from the 1991 and 1996 Census of South Africa13 (Statistics
South Africa 1991, 1998). These allow for separate identification of individuals belonging to
different ethnolinguistic groups according to the first language they speak. The native African
groups in the database are Swazi, Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga and Venda.14 For each
MD, we count the total number of individuals in each group and compute the relative share of
each group within the black majority.
Throughout the analysis, we employ the binary version of the polarization index implemented
in Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 2010), which falls within the
class of measures proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). The ethnolinguistic polarization within
the black majority is computed as
ELPWithin−Black = 1−
N∑
i=1
(
1/2− pii
1/2
)2
pii (1)
where pii is the within-black share of group i and N is the number of groups. The index value
ranges between 0 and 1, with the maximum value being reached in presence of two groups of
the same size. The index combines information on both the number of groups and their relative
size, returning a distribution measure linked to the generation of social tension between equally
distant groups (Esteban and Ray 1994). In the presence of more than two groups, the index
value decreases monotonically with the number of groups if they are all of the same size. It is
worth here noticing that, when groups have different sizes, changes in the population size of
a given group do not map systematically into changes in the polarization index. Esteban and
Ray (1994) provide a series of examples in this respect.
13Access to the 10% sample Census data for both years was kindly provided by DataFirst Research Unit at
the University of Cape Town.
14Desmet, Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Wacziarg (2012) show how to make use of the genealogical relationship between
world languages in the construction of distribution indexes. In line with their approach, we use information
contained in the Ethnologue linguistic database (Lewis 2009) assuming all languages at the same level to be as
equally distant from the proto-languages of their respective families. We build our measure considering black
ethnolinguistc groups in South Africa which correspond to level 11 in the world language tree as reported in
Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix.
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3.2 Conflict
The measure of conflict incidence is derived from the Geo-referenced Event Dataset of the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP-GED v1.5).15 Assembled by the Department of Peace
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, it provides geo-referenced information on organized
violence in Africa between 1989 and 2010, detailing different categories - state-based conflict,
non-state conflict and one-sided violence.16 The data are disaggregated spatially and temporally
down to the level of individual events of fatal violence. For each conflict event, information is
given on date of the event, place of the event (with coordinates), actors participating and
estimates of fatalities. A conflict event is recorded in the database if it caused at least 1 death
and it involved actors engaged in a nationwide conflict which caused at least 25 deaths in a year
in the period (1989-2010).
We measure the yearly incidence of armed confrontations between black-dominated organized
groups in South Africa at the MD level by counting the number of related geo-referenced conflict
events in each MD per year. These amount to all non-state conflict events.17
3.3 Socio-economic and Geographical Controls
We aggregate further information for the surveyed territories at the MD level from Census 1991
and 1996, checking for consistency across waves. Moreover, we use data on population, rural
population, number of individuals reporting no education, number of unemployed individuals,
number of individuals out of the labor force and number of South African citizens.18
In addition to conflict and Census data, we use three additional data sources. Following
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014), we use NOOA (2012) night-time light satellite
images data for 1992 (the first available year) and 1996 as a proxy for economic conditions in
South Africa at the MD level.19. Consistently with their approach, we average night-time light
15Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. The dataset is available at
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/ged/data.php. See Melander and Sundberg (2011) for the last data presentation. See
Eck (2012) for a complete discussion of the UCDP-GED database and its comparison with the Armed Con-
flict Location Events Dataset (ACLED). The UCPD-GED geocoding and precision is there concluded to be far
superior to ACLED’s and found particularly suitable for the study of conflict at the sub-national level.
16State-based conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least
25 battle-related deaths in a year in the period (1989-2010). Non-state conflict refers to the use of armed force
between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least
25 battle-related deaths in a year in the period. One-sided violence refers to the use of armed force by the
government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a
year in the period (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010).
17In the study of the relationship between ethnic polarization and conflict, the literature has used conflict data
from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 2010; Esteban, Mayoral, and
Ray 2012). This is mainly due to the cross-countries analysis and large time span (1945 to 2010) these studies
usually consider. Non-state and one-sided conflicts are there considered as outcomes to test robustness of results.
18In our regression specification we use the logarithm of these variables, augmenting all values by 0.01 when
some of them are equal to zero. Results go through other variables specification and level shift.
19For an extensive discussion of these data and their validity as a proxy for economic conditions in the african
territories see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014, 2013) See also Doll, Muller, and Morley (2006) and Sutton,
Elvidge, and Ghosh (2007). In our regression specifications, consistently with Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2014, 2013), we augment the night-time light satellite measure by 0.01 before taking its logarithm. Results are
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density across 30-second grid areas (approximately 1 square kilometer) within the same MD. In
line with the existing literature, we also make use of geographical variables as controls. In our
cross-sectional specification we include use a MD-level measure of terrain ruggedness(data from
Nunn and Puga (2012)). The measure is computed by averaging 30-second grid area observa-
tions belonging to the same MD.20 The terrain slope index from Global Aero-ecological Zones
(GAEZ) data (IIASA/FAO 2012) is created by averaging 5-minute by 5-minute (approximately
9 km by 9 km) grid-cells observations within the same MD. Finally, area accessibility from
GAEZ is computed as estimated travel time to nearest city with 50,000 or more inhabitants in
year 2000.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Preliminary Analysis
More than 2,000 non-state conflict events are geo-referenced in MDs of South Africa in the
UCDP-GED dataset in the period 1989-1996.21 ANC and IFP confronted each other in more
than 85% of events. As for the others, within the most numerous are those where the United
Democratic Front (UDF) is involved against the IFP, and the ANC Greens faction against the
ANC Reds faction. An average number of 1.2 non-state conflict events per MD is recorded
in 1991, with cross-district variation being larger than four times the national mean. Overall,
conflict prevalence decreases after democratization in 1994. The average is 0.1 in 1996, but with
a cross-district variation of 0.7.22
[Table 1]
Table 1 shows the population sizes of the African native ethnolinguistic groups in South Africa
according to the 1991 and 1996 Census. Together with nationwide stocks, the table reports
the differences in the population of each ethnolinguistic group between 1991 and 1996. MDs in
those Bantustans which were already granted independence are not covered by the 1991 Census
of the Republic of South Africa. The inclusion of former independent Bantustan territories in
the 1996 Census generates a dramatic increase in the population stocks of the corresponding
ethnolinguistic groups. In the fourth column, the same overall differences are computed looking
only at those 294 districts which are part of both the 1991 and 1996 Census. We find evidence
of a substantial inflow into these territories of individuals belonging to ethnicities previously
segregated in the independent Bantustans. At the extreme, the Tswana group population
unaltered with respect to other or no level shift.
20Data are available at http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
21Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the total number of one-sided conflict events involving the Government
and non-state conflict events per year in MDs in South Africa recorded in the UCDP-GED dataset, together with
the estimated total number of deaths.
22Summary statistics for the derived sample are reported in Table A.2 of the appendix.
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increases by more than 30%.
On top of migration inflows from independent Bantustans, we find evidence of substantial in-
ternal mobility.23 According to 1996 Census data, 2.5 millions blacks moved from one MD
to another in between 1991 and 1996. Figure 4 shows the change in the population share of
the three biggest ethnolinguistic groups at the district level in between 1991 and 1996, plot-
ted against the share of black population in 1991. It is worth noticing that the most relevant
changes do not seem to be concentrated in those districts where the share of blacks in 1991 was
either negligible or close to one.24
[Figure 4]
As suggested by the above figures, the negligible change in average within-black polarization be-
tween 1991 and 1996 hides substantial variability over time across districts. The time difference
goes from a minimum of -0.89 to a maximum of one, spanning almost the entire support of ad-
missible values. Remarkably, the standard deviation of the overtime chenge in the polarization
index is as high as half of its 1991 cross sectional standard deviation.
About 32% of conflict events recorded in 1991 takes place in the 25% of districts with the highest
level of within-black polarization. More importantly, the relationship appears to be stronger
when within-province variability in conflict incidence is considered. The 25% of districts with
the highest within-black polarization have on average 0.66 conflicts more than the province
average, as opposed to the 0.48 less recorded in the 25% of districts with the lowest within-
black polarization.
4.2 Cross-sectional Estimates, 1991
We start the regression analysis by exploiting cross-district variation in both within-black po-
larization and conflict in 1991. We thus compare the incidence of conflict in 1991 across districts
characterized in the same year by different levels of within-black polarization, in the search of
a systematic relationship between the two variables. We adopt the following linear regression
specification
conf ip91 = γp + β ELPWB ip91 + Z
′
ipω + X
′
ip91ϕ+ uip91 (2)
23Using data from the South Africa Migration and Health Survey (SAMHS), Reed (2013) studies internal
migration patterns amongst the black population of South Africa in the second half of the twentieth century. He
reports non-negligible migration rates even before the repeal of the Pass Law in 1986. Nonetheless, migration
rates spike in 1991 and after, and estimates are very similar to the one we obtain using data from Statistics South
Africa (1998). Indeed, SAMHS data are recognized by Reed (2013) to compare favorably to Census data.
24Figure A.1 in the Appendix carries further exploration of migration patterns.
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where conf ip91 is the number of non-state conflict events recorded in district i in province p in
1991. ELPWB ip91, computed as discussed in Section 4, is the within-black polarization index
in the same district in 1991, while Zip is a set of time-invariant district geographical characteris-
tics (ruggedness, slope index and accessibility). Xip91 is the vector of time-varying demographic
and economic controls, capturing time-variant district characteristics in 1991 (log of population,
black population, rural population, number of individuals reporting no education, number of
unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force and number of South Africa citizens).
γp captures province fixed effects, netting out average differences across provinces. The residual
uip91 captures instead those unobserved factors which affect conflict incidence.
[Table 2]
Table 2 provides the corresponding results. Throughout all specifications, an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation with province fixed effects is run on the available 1991 sample. Given
the possible endogeneity of within-black polarization to conflict intensity, we start by providing
results from a regression with no additional controls in the first column. The results show a
positive and significant relationship between the within-blacks polarization index and number
of conflict events at the district level.25 An increase of one cross-district standard deviation of
the within-black polarization index is associated with 0.8 more conflict events per year in 1991,
more than half of the national average. Columns (2) and (3) include additional controls such as
population, black population, and the Night-time Lights measure as proxy for local economic
activity (all in logs).26 Both the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of interest turn
out to be almost unaffected. Column (4) reports estimation results after further including
geographic controls such as indexes of ruggedness, terrain slope and accessibility. The coefficient
of interest remains unchanged in both magnitude and significance with respect to columns (2)
and (3). Results in column (5) show the results from the full specification including as controls
a number of economic covariates such as the log of rural population, number of unemployed
individuals and number of individuals reporting no education. The coefficient of the within-
blacks polarization is now lower in magnitude and significant only at the 11% level. Nonetheless,
we find results to be consistent with the hypothesis of the observed non-state conflict events to
be qualifiable as expressed along ethnic lines. These findings are in line with the cross-country
literature relating ethnic polarization to conflict as discussed in Section 2.
25We performed the same estimations using a Poisson model specification which takes into account the count
nature of our dependent variable. Results are substantially unchanged. These are available in the Online
Appendix. Finally, as a further check, we use the logarithm of the number of conflict events (augmented by 0.01)
as outcome in all specifications and find highly consistent results.
26Notice that the inclusion of population stocks allows to look at the relationship of interest keeping population
constant, thus being analogous to the use of the number of conflict events per capita as dependent variable. Indeed,
replacing the latter as outcome yields equally significant results.
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4.3 First-difference Estimates, 1991-1996
The restoration of free internal mobility of blacks after 1991 largely accounts for time varia-
tion in ethnolinguistic group population shares per district. Together with initial cross-district
variation, it opens the way for the implementation of a first-difference strategy which looks
at the evolution of both within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and non-state conflict, net
of district-specific time-invariant characteristics. In other words, it is possible to compare the
evolution of conflict across districts experiencing differential changes in ethnic composition, and
test whether the observed change in within-black polarization systematically correlates with the
change in non-state conflict incidence.
We combine the available information from both 1991 and 1996 and adopt the following speci-
fication
∆conf i96−91 = δ + β ∆ELPWB i96−91 + ∆X
′
i96−91ϕ+ ∆ui96−91 (3)
where ∆conf i96−91 is the change in the number of recorded non-state conflict events in district
i in between year 1991 and 1996, while ∆ELPWB i96−91 is the corresponding change in the
within-blacks polarization index. The proposed first-difference specification allows to cancel
out both observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics at the district level. The
effect of nationwide events (such as democratization in 1994) and general time trends are instead
captured by the constant term δ. As before, Xit is the vector of time-varying demographic and
economic controls in year t (population, blacks, night-time light, rural, etc.). The difference
residual ∆ui96−91 captures those unobserved changes and factors which affect the change in
conflict incidence.
Results are reported in Table 3. All specifications are implemented over the sample of districts
for which Census data are available for both 1991 and 1996. The first column provides the
results from the simple regression specification. Notice that the negative estimate of the con-
stant term is consistent with the general decrease in conflict prevalence with the first democratic
elections in 1994. More importantly, the estimated coefficient of the ethnolinguistic polarization
is highly significant. The point estimate more than doubles the obtained from the 1991 cross-
sectional analysis.27 An increase in one cross-district standard deviation in the within-black
ethnolinguistic polarization measure is now associated with 2 more conflict per district, more
than the 1991 national average. Changes in ethnic composition at the district level are thus
found to be informative of the evolution of conflict. Column (2) and (3) show that the results
are robust to the inclusion of time-variant economic controls. The coefficient of interest remains
significant and relatively stable.28
27We produced estimates from a non linear specification. Results are still positive and significant using a
fixed-effects Poisson model. These are available in the Online Appendix. As before, we also use the logarithm
of the number of conflict events (augmented by 0.01) as outcome in all specifications and still find consistent
results.
28Table A.3 in the Appendix shows how estimates of the coefficient of the within-black ethnolinguistic polar-
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[Table 3]
Column (4) provides estimation results assuming heteroskedastic difference residuals and es-
timating Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors (White 1980). This allows to take into
account heterogeneity in the variability of the first-difference residuals in the computation of
the standard errors used for inference. The coefficient of interest is still significant at the 10%
level. In column (5), we take into account cross-sectional dependence of first-difference resid-
uals and follow Conley (1999) in allowing for non-zero correlation when coordinate distance
between districts’ centroids is less than 1 degree latitude and/or 1 degree longitude (approx-
imately 110 km). The estimate of our coefficient of interest retains significance at the 10%
level. The same holds when spatial spillovers are directly taken into account by including as
regressor the average change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in neighboring districts
∆ELPWB j96−91. Assuming heteroskedastic difference residuals, the point estimate of the co-
efficient of interest is somewhat lower than before, but still significant at the 10% level. The
average change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in neighboring district is also found
to be highly correlated with the change in conflict incidence, with the corresponding coefficient
being significant at the 5% level.
Finally, column (7) reports instead the results from a specification which augments the first-
difference one by including the number of non-state conflict events in the 1989 and 1990. Given
the general decrease in the number of conflict events over the period, we want to test whether
the systematic relationship we find between within-black polarization and conflict incidence is
robust to conditioning on a measure of pre-1991 conflict incidence.29 The coefficient of the
latter is negative and highly significant. This means that the observed decrease in the number
of conflict events in between 1991 and 1996 was higher in those districts with a high number of
conflicts in 1989 and 1990. More importantly, we still find evidence of a systematic relationship
between within-black polarization and conflict incidence. The estimated coefficient is highly
significant. Together with the negative estimate of the pre-1991 conflict measure coefficient, the
decrease in the point estimate of the change in within-black polarization suggests the existence
of a negative relationship between the latter and conflict incidence in 1989-1990.
ization measure in the first-difference specification remains highly significant when controlling separately for the
changes of each within-black group shares. None of the latter individually thus seem to be responsible for the
relationship we find in the baseline specification.
29Given the adopted linear regression model specification, the estimator of the parameter in column (7) is
inconsistent and not directly comparable with the ones from the simple first-difference specification. The inclu-
sion of a lag as a regressor in the first-difference model does not allow to net out district-level time-invariant
unobservable characteristics. We intentionally compromise on the consistency of our estimator in order to check
whether our results are robust to a partial solution to the problem of mean-reversion and convergence.
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4.4 First-difference with Cluster-specific Trends
One possible concern with the above results is that these can be driven by the presence of
unobserved factors which affect the evolution of both ethnic composition and conflict in the
same way, generating a spurious correlation between the two. For example, those districts where
polarization increased in 1991-1996 might be systematically different from others in terms of
geographic characteristics (Michalopoulos 2012). The same factors might have been on their
own responsible for the change in the incidence of conflict within the black majority, generating
a spurious correlation between changes in ethnic composition and conflict.
We study the extent to which these issues are likely to affect the results by looking at the evolu-
tion of within-black polarization and conflict within clusters of neighboring districts. Similarly
to the neighbors-pair fixed-effects analysis in Acemoglu, Garca-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012),
our argument is that districts located next to each other are highly comparable in terms of both
observable and unobservable characteristics. As a result, when looking at the relationship of
interest within clusters of neighboring districts, it is possible to net out those common unob-
served sources of heterogeneity and time-varying omitted variables, possibly correlated with the
evolution of both polarization and conflict incidence. Only residual variability in the variables
of interest is therefore exploited for identification.
We define as treated those districts g ∈M where our polarization measure decreased more than
average in 1991-1996. We then keep their neighboring non-treated districts f ∈ N(g), and drop
treated districts with no non-treated neighboring districts. We obtain a sub-sample of 227 out
of the initial 294 districts.30 For each treated district g ∈ M and its non-treated neighbors
f ∈ N(g), we focus on 1991-1996 differences and consider the following model
∆confg96−91 = δ + γg + β ∆ELPWB g96−91 + ∆X′g96−91ϕ+ ∆εg96−91 g ∈M
∆conff96−91 = δ + γg + β ∆ELPWB f96−91 + ∆X′f96−91ϕ+ ∆εf96−91 f ∈ N(g)
(4)
where, as before, ∆conf i96−91 is the change in the number of recorded non-state conflict events
in district i in between year 1991 and 1996, while ∆ELPWB i96−91 is the change in the within-
blacks polarization index (with i = g, f). Time trends are still controlled for by δ. γg captures
cluster-specific trends, controlling for unobservable determinants of evolution of conflict in 1991-
1996, possibly related with change in polarization over the period. In other words, we include a
dummy for each cluster of districts, taking value one for all treated and non-treated observation
in the cluster. Xit is the vector of time-variant district characteristics in year t (population,
blacks, night-time light, rural, etc.). The difference residual ∆εi96−91 captures those idiosyn-
cratic unobserved changes and factors which affect the change in conflict incidence, net of
cluster-specific trends.
30Following the proposed definition, the final subsample contains 105 treated and 122 non-treated districts.
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In the final restricted sample, each non-treated district is possibly neighbor of more than one
treated district. Thus, there exist several different ways to group districts into clusters. We
implement a bootstrap-type procedure where we run a series of regressions, matching in each
repetition each non-treated district to a single treated district. The results deliver an empirical
distribution of parameter estimates βˆ which can be used for inference.31.
[Table 4]
Results are shown in Table 4. Column (1) reports the estimate of the coefficient of interest
when only the logarithm of total black population, total population and the night-time satellite
light variables are included as controls. Netting out cluster specific trends and exploiting only
within-cluster residual variability, we still find a significant relationship between the change in
within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and the evolution of conflict. The corresponding point
estimate is highly significant and somewhat larger than the one obtained before. The full set of
other time-variant economic controls is included in column (2), with results being substantially
unchanged. A full set of third-degree polynomials of covariates is included in column (3). We
do this in order to control for non-linear discontinuities at the border, which may themselves
be correlated with the outcome variable (Acemoglu, Garca-Jimeno, and Robinson 2012). The
point estimate is still highly significant, even if lower in magnitude.
Given the restricted sample, we attach to these estimates only a local interpretation. Nonethe-
less, results are largely consistent with the ones derived in the previous section. If anything,
the presence of unobserved omitted factors which are systematically correlated with both the
change in within-black polarization and conflict incidence seem to downward bias our initial
first-difference estimate of the parameter of interest.
However, exploiting differential changes in ethnic composition across neighboring districts can
still be problematic. Internal migration is the primary source of variation for the change in
ethnic composition at the district level in between 1991 and 1996. According to 1996 Census
data, migration across contiguous districts represent a high fraction of total district-level moves
in the period. Focusing on the districts in our sample, Table 5 shows, for each ethnic group, the
average number of moves towards neighboring districts as a fraction of total outmigration in
1991-1996. On average, 35% of Xhosa movers from a given district are estimated to relocate in
neighboring districts. The same percentage is 28% for movers from the Zulu ethnic group. The
relocation of internal migrants in neighboring districts and the differential changes in ethnic
composition that follow could possibly be endogenous to the evolution of conflict. The purpose
of the next section is to address this issue in a systematic way.
31The focus on clusters instead of pairs of neighboring districts and the implementation of the suggested
bootstrap-type procedure differs from Acemoglu, Garca-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012) Our approach avoids du-
plicating observations as required by their neighbors-pair fixed-effects strategy, and delivers standard errors for
inference without building up and estimating the parameters of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals as
required by their random-effects strategy.
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[Table 5]
4.5 Internal Migration and Instrumental Variable Strategy
With the implementation of a first-difference identification strategy we compare districts which
experienced different changes in the within-black polarization measure in between 1991 and
1996, and find heterogeneity along this dimension to be significantly correlated with the observed
changes in the incidence of conflict within the black majority at the district level. Changes over
time in the polarization measure occur when group population sizes change at different rates:
if all ethnolinguistic group populations were changing at the same rate in all districts, the
polarization measure would have not changed anywhere. Therefore, one concern for the validity
of our empirical exercise is that the disproportional changes in the size of ethnolinguistic groups
may themselves be driven by the change of conflict incidence.
We focus on internal migration as the main source of variability for the change in districts’
ethnic composition. Conflict causes displacement of individuals and households. High non-state
conflict incidence in 1991 could be framed as a push factor that positively affected individuals’
propensity to migrate out of the district after 1991. By the same token, expectations about
low non-state conflict incidence in 1996 can be conceptualized as a pull factor in the same
framework. If agents’ expectations were fulfilled, migration decisions would be endogenous to
conflict incidence in both 1991 and 1996. Still, this does not necessarily imply that migration
decisions are endogenous to the changes in conflict incidence over the period. Moreover, even if
this was the case, our exercise would be invalidated only if the following two conditions are met.
First, endogenous migration decisions need to map into endogenous disproportional changes
in ethnolinguistic group population sizes. Second, the resulting changes in the ethnolinguistic
polarization index need to be positively correlated with changes in conflict incidence. Both
requirements are far from being immediately framed in a coherent narrative. Suppose that one
given ethnic group has comparative advantages in armed confrontation. Individuals belonging
to this group may thus migrate disproportionally more towards districts where conflict incidence
is expected to increase. If expectations are fulfilled, we would observe positive changes in the
size of the given group in those districts which experienced higher changes in conflict incidence.
However, the same percentage change in the size of a given group does not map systematically
into changes in the polarization index if the latter is heterogeneous across districts to begin
with. This is even more the case in the presence of more than two groups as in our case. In this
respect, Esteban and Ray (1994) show with a series of examples the intuition for the absence of
a partial order for increasing polarization. Furthermore, Table A.3 in the Appendix shows how
changes in each within-black group shares cannot individually account for all the variability
of the change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization, whose coefficient estimates remain
highly significant in the first-difference specification.
To investigate the issue, we implement an instrumental variable (IV) strategy where pairwise
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distance between districts is used to predict the location decision of internal migrants. We
use information from the 1996 Census on surveyed individuals who declare to have moved in
between 1991 and 1996 and to have been resident in a different district in 1991. Using the same
data, Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and Van Zyl (2003) provide evidence of a negative relationship
between the number of migrants moving between two districts and pairwise distance between
them. We exploit this feature and estimate a conditional logit model (Cameron and Trivedi
2005) for the location decision of migrants in the sample of the form
pij =
eβ distanceij∑
j∈S eβ distanceij
(5)
where distanceij is the distance (in km) between district i and j in the set of South Africa
districts S. We thus estimate the probability of each individual leaving district i after 1991 to
be observed in district j in 1996 as predicted by the values of pairwise distance only.32
In a simulation exercise, we next assume that a fraction x of individuals from each ethnolin-
guistic group e leave each district i ∈ S after 1991, and allocate them to districts j 6= i using
the estimated probabilities pˆij derived as above. The value of x is chosen by matching it with
the total district-level outflow rate of blacks who located in any other district over the rele-
vant period, equal to 8.66%.33 We thus compute predicted population stocks for each black
ethnolinguistic group in each district i in 1996 as
N̂e,i,1996 = Ne,i,1991(1− x) +
∑
j∈S
pˆji xNe,j,1991 (6)
The predicted population share are next used to construct a predicted within-black ethnolin-
guistic polarization index for 1996 using the same formula as in section 4. We then take the
difference between our predicted ethnolinguistic polarization in 1996 and the actual one in 1991
in order to obtain the predicted change in polarization between 1991 and 1996, ∆E˜LPWB,i.
Notice that, by forcing x to be the same for all ethnic groups in all districts, we rely on pˆji
only in the generation of predicted time variability in the change in the polarization index.
Our predicted value for the change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization is the one which
would be observed in case a given exogenous fraction of individuals in each ethnic group in each
district were to leave after 1991 and locate in another district according to what predicted by
distance only. Indeed, individual reallocation probabilities are computed as independent from
conflict levels and their changes at both origin and destination, and assigned to each fictitiously
displaced individual. We use this prediction as a source of exogenous variation for the actual
change in polarization observed in the data, ruling out the potential endogeneity of individuals’
32Conditional Logit estimation results are provided in the Online Appendix to the paper.
33Focusing on the 294 districts in our sample, we calculate the total number of individuals moving from one
MD to another in between 1991 and 1996 as recorded in the 1996 Census. We then divide this number by the
total number of individuals belonging to any black ethnolinguistic group living in any of the 294 districts surveyed
in the 1991 Census of the Republic of South Africa.
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migration decisions. Furthermore, focusing on predicted internal migration allows to validate
the latter as the main mechanism for the change in districts’ ethnic composition and rule out
other potentially endogenous sources of disproportional changes in ethnic group population
sizes, such as disease (specifically HIV) prevalence.
[Table 6]
Results from both the first and the second-stage regressions are reported in Table 6. Condi-
tional on the other variables included as controls, the F-statistics for the significance test of the
instrument in the first-stage regression are safely above 10 in all specifications. The instrument
appears strong enough in producing a relevant shift in the actual value of the change in the
within-black polarization index. For consistency with the previous analysis, we start by includ-
ing only the total number of blacks, total population and night-time satellite light value in logs
as controls in the first column. The point estimate of the coefficient of interest is significant
at the 10% level and more then doubles the one obtained in Table 3, suggesting the presence
of a downward bias in previous estimates from endogenous migration decisions. An increase in
within-black polarization of one 1991 cross-district standard deviation is now associated with
4.5 more conflict events, almost four times the 1991 national average. However, results from
a Hausman test do not allow to reject the hypothesis of both the first-difference and the IV
estimators being consistent (Hausman 1978). In the second column, we allow first-difference
residuals to be heteroskedastic and estimate Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors (White
1980). The estimate of the within-black polarization coefficient are significant at the 5% level.34
The same pattern of significance is observed when conditioning on the full set of economic
controls in column (3) and (4), with the point estimate being somewhat lower in magnitude.
Results from the implemented instrumental variable strategy confirm the existence of a positive
relationship between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and non-state conflict incidence
in the data. Ruling out potential threats from both the endogeneity of individual migration
decisions and other sources of differential changes in ethnic group populations sizes yields a
much bigger point estimate of the effect of interest. The downward bias in the first-difference
specification might indeed be caused by heterogeneous exposure and/or resistance of ethnic
groups to diseases, which could be possibly negatively correlated with the change in within-
black polarization, but positively correlated with the change in conflict incidence. However,
given the spatial heterogeneity of internal migration flows we observe in the data, we cannot
exclude differences in magnitude to be attributable to the local interpretation of the instrumental
variable estimate of the parameter we wish to identify (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996).
34Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors may be lower than conventional ones. Angrist and Pischke (2010)
show that this can be the case whenever lower variance of the residual is associated with covariate values far from
the mean of the covariate distribution. In our case, given that the mean of the predicted change in polarization is
close to zero, this would mean that those districts which are assigned by our instrument to experience the smallest
change in polarization also have higher variability in the first-difference residuals of the change in conflict.
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4.5.1 Exclusion Restriction and Falsification Tests
One possible concern with the proposed instrumental variable approach is that, despite the
role played by internal migration patterns as estimated using pairwise distances, the predicted
change in polarization is still a function of local ethnic distribution in 1991. The latter may
not be uncorrelated with unobserved district-level characteristics, which may themselves affect
the evolution of conflict incidence in the following year. Additionally, the ethnic distribution in
1991 could have been strategically manipulated by the apartheid rulers or the very same ethnic
groups in order to shape the evolution of conflict in the years to follow. In both cases, if the
variability in the change of polarization induced by the proposed instrument were to come from
the variation in ethnic composition at the MD level in 1991, the exclusion restriction would be
violated.
In order to address this concern, we plot in Figure 5 the relationship between the change in
conflict incidence 1991-1996 and the initial level of polarization across districts in 1991, together
with the line fitting the relationship between the two. The figure shows the absence of any re-
lationship between the two variables. Nonetheless, our instrument is also a function of ethnic
composition in other districts, with this relationship being stronger for closer districts. In Fig-
ure 6, we explore the relationship between the change in conflict incidence 1991-1996 and the
average level of polarization in neighboring districts in 1991. As before, we find no significant
relationship between ethnolinguistic polarization in neighboring districts and the evolution of
conflict in the following years. Given the highly non-linear nature of our instrument, we also
plot the change in conflict incidence between 1991 and 1996 over the initial within-black share
of each ethnic group in 1991, and the average share of each ethnic group in neighboring districts.
All plots are depicted in Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. No meaningful relationships are
detectable. We take evidence from these results altogether as reassuring: the absence of any
relationship between ethnic composition in 1991 and the evolution of conflict in the following
years speaks in favor of our exclusion restriction.
[Figures 5 and 6]
Another way to address the same concern is to show that the variation induced by the instru-
ment relies on predicted internal migration patterns, and does not overlap with the one due to
1991 polarization values. We thus implement a falsification test where we use the within-black
polarization index in the MD in 1991 as instrument for its actual change in between 1991 and
1996. The idea of the test is straightforward: if the variability we exploit in our original strat-
egy were to be driven by the initial distribution of ethnic groups, results from this falsification
test - where predicted migration is not playing any role - would be similar to the previous
ones. Results are reported in Table 7. Conditional on the other variables included as controls,
within-black polarization index in 1991 is found to be a strong negative predictor of the change
in polarization. This is due to the mechanical negative correlation that arises when regressing
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the predicted change in polarization over the level of polarization in the previous period, as the
latter appears in the former with a negative sign. Nonetheless, second-stage regression results
for the coefficient of interest are insignificant in all specifications.
[Table 7]
We repeat the same exercise in Table 8, but using now as instrument the average level of po-
larization in neighboring districts in 1991. No significant relationship is here found in the first
stage. Both the initial level of polarization in the district and the one in neighboring districts
are used as instruments in Table 9. Despite the strong first stage, we again find no significant
relationship in the second stage.
[Tables 8 and 9]
Again, we interpret these results altogether as validating our original instrumental variable
strategy. We there rely on a non-trivial source of variation which stems out of internal migration
moves, as the variability in the endogenous regressor induced by measures of ethnic distribution
in 1991 does not relate systematically with the evolution of conflict in the following years.
Internal migration flows are thus found to be the relevant mechanism for the generation of
changes in within-black polarization index which mattered for the evolution of conflict in the
period.35
As a final check, we investigate whether the change in ethnolinguistic polarization is systemat-
ically related with any pre-existing trend in conflict incidence. We argue this is unlikely to be
the case, as the years between 1991 and 1996 exhibit an overall decrease in conflict incidence
following democratization in 1994. Nonetheless, given that our conflict data are available since
1989, we can replace as outcome the change in conflict incidence between 1989 and 1991 in our
first-difference specification. Results are reported in Table 10. By construction, the first stage
regression results are identical to those belonging to our main IV specification. Second stage
estimates are instead non-significant. This allows us to conclude that the relationship we found
between the change in ethnic polarization between 1991 and 1996 does not capture a general
trend in the evolution of conflict, and its relationship with the latter is indeed specific of the
period under investigation.
[Table 10]
35We also use 1980 Census data and replicate the falsification test using the within-black polarization at the
district level in 1980. Apartheid legislation was still fully in place in the period, as the Pass Law was only repealed
in 1986. Using observations for the 279 districts available in the sample, we find within-black polarization in
1980 to have no predictive power for its change in between 1991 and 1996.
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5 Conclusions
This paper studies the extent to which conflict incidence correlates over time with contempo-
raneous measures of ethnic distribution. The history of contemporary South Africa in 1991
through 1996 carries with it substantial variation in the variables of interest. Combining Cen-
sus data with geo-referenced information on conflict, we show the incidence of violent struggles
amongst black-dominated organized groups during the fall of apartheid to be positively corre-
lated with within-black ethnolinguistic polarization. We thus provide a qualification of these
conflicts as expressed through ethnic markers, despite their primarily political nature. Time
variability along both dimensions allows to investigate the relationship of interest after clearing
out the impact of unobserved time-invariant characteristics at the local level. A one cross-
district standard deviation increase in within-black polarization is found to be associated with
an increase in the number of conflict events of more than the 1991 national average. Findings
are robust to several additional checks. Comparing the evolution of within-black polarization
and conflict within clusters of neighboring districts still yields highly significant results. The
same holds when focusing specifically on the internal migration channel. We simulate migra-
tion patterns and the resulting changes in ethnic distribution using location probabilities as
predicted by pairwise distance between districts. Instrumental variable point estimates are still
positive and bigger than first-difference ones, validating internal migration as the main source of
variability for the changes in ethnic distribution which mattered for the evolution of conflict.36
The approach and empirical results in this paper contribute to disclose the potential of the use
of micro-level data in the study of social conflict and its determinants. On one hand, migration-
driven changes in the ethnic distribution at the local level are here revealed to be informative of
conflict prevalence. The exploration of how this interacts with displacement caused by conflict
itself constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research. On the other hand, the specificities of the
South Africa setting can be further investigated in order to study the effect of democratization
on conflict. Evidence from this paper suggests the heterogeneity and divisions within the newly
enfranchised majority to interact with nationwide institutional changes and still inform conflict
incidence at the local level even after democratization in 1994. The need for a theoretical and
empirical investigation of this argument motivates our future research agenda.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Ethnic Group Population Sizes
Total Population Difference 1996-1991
1991 Census 1996 Census Overall Study Sample
298 MDs 354 MDs 294 MDs
Xhosa 2,493,382 7,206,005 4,712,623 77,370
Zulu 8,416,125 9,216,413 800,288 163,555
Sotho 6,414,684 7,378,473 963,789 234,038
Swazi 943,989 1,017,233 73,244 45,365
Tswana 1,437,660 3,299,902 1,862,242 463,044
Tsonga 1,450,874 1,757,589 306,715 82,791
Venda 116,533 876,546 760,013 2,296
Notes. The Table shows the total ethnic group population sizes in our sample in 1991 and
1996, together with the overall difference and the difference using only all districts for which
information is available in both 1991 and 1996 samples (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991,
1998).
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Table 2: 1991 Cross-sectional Estimation
Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ELPWB 2.399 2.464 2.444 2.381 1.888
(1.07) (1.09) (1.10) (1.10) (1.17)
Blacks (log) -0.046 -0.029 -0.257 -0.348
(0.42) (0.43) (0.47) (0.52)
Population (log) 0.367 0.312 0.518 0.226
(0.52) (0.55) (0.59) (3.89)
Night-time Lights (log) 0.038 0.018 -0.014
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Rural Population (log) 0.001
(0.13)
No Education (log) 0.325
(1.64)
Unemployed (log) 1.203
(0.74)
Constant -0.425 -3.973 -3.414 -1.032 0.607
(0.74) (3.19) (3.66) (4.57) (5.28)
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls N N N Y Y
Other Economic Controls N N N N Y
Observations 294 294 294 291 291
R2 0.180 0.185 0.185 0.199 0.214
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports Ordinary Least Squares coefficients
estimates from the 1991 cross-sectional specification. The unit of observation is a MD in South
Africa for which information is available in 1991. The dependent variable is the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD in 1991 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB is the
district-level within-black polarization measure. Other controls are defined as in the data section
(Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; Nunn and Puga 2012; IIASA/FAO 2012; NOOA
2012).
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Table 3: First-difference Estimation
Change in Total No. of Non-state Conflict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ELPWB 5.924 5.562 5.178 5.178 5.178 4.758 4.107
(1.59) (1.63) (1.66) (2.96) (3.04) (2.79) (1.41)
Non-state Conf 89-90 -0.273
(0.03)
∆ELPWB j 7.692
(3.58)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.276 -0.325 -0.325 -0.325 -0.354 -0.228
(0.43) (0.45) (0.27) (0.26) (0.34) (0.38)
∆ Population (log) 0.019 5.366 5.366 5.366 2.885 -0.796
(0.75) (4.80) (6.70) (5.10) (6.34) (4.11)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.277 -0.239 -0.239 -0.239 -0.246 -0.129
(0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.29) (0.25) (0.13)
∆ Rural Population (log) -0.682 -0.682 -0.682 -0.677 -0.378
(0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.19)
∆ No Education (log) -1.011 -1.011 -1.011 0.142 0.540
(1.75) (1.94) (1.43) (1.78) (1.49)
∆ Unemployed (log) -0.113 -0.113 -0.113 -0.037 -0.112
(0.83) (0.61) (0.68) (0.61) (0.70)
Constant -1.068 -0.882 -3.718 -3.718 -3.718 -3.589 -1.290
(0.28) (0.30) (1.91) (1.80) (1.89) (1.75) (1.63)
Other Economic Controls N N Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.045 0.058 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.112 0.354
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-difference coefficients estimates. The unit of observation is
a MD in South Africa for which information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in total
number of non-state conflict events coded in the MD in between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ∆ELPWB is
the district-level change in within-black polarization measure. ∆ELPWB j is the average change in neighboring districts.
Non-state Conf 89-90 is the total number of conflict events coded in the MD in 1989-1990. Other controls are defined as
in the data section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012). (1), (2), (3) are first-difference estimates
assuming homoskedastic difference residuals; those in (4) and (6) are first-difference estimates assuming heteroskedastic
difference residuals; in (5) we allow for cross-sectional dependence in the structure of difference residuals (Conley 1999)
allowing for non-zero correlation when coordinate distance between districts’ centroids is less than 1 degree latitude and/or
1 degree longitude (approximately 110 km). Those in (7) are estimates from the first-difference model augmented with the
measure of pre-1991 conflict incidence, assuming homoskedastic difference residuals.
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Table 4: First-difference with Cluster-specific Trends
Change in Total No. of Non-state Conflict Events
(1) (2) (3)
∆ELPWB 6.08 6.36 5.26
(1.83) (1.98) (1.51)
Other Economic Controls N Y Y
Polynomial of Controls N N Y
Observations 227 227 227
Repetitions 200 200 200
Notes. Empirical standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports coefficients estimates and
standard errors from a first-difference specification with cluster-specific trends. A restricted sample
of treated districts are kept from the initial sample, together with their neighboring control districts
(see text for details). A bootstrap-type procedure is implemented, where at each repetition every
control district is randomly matched to a single treated district and coefficients from the first-
difference specification with cluster-specific trends are estimated. The total number of blacks and
total population, and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in (1), while all
economic controls are included in (2). Specification (3) is augmented with a 3rd order polynomial
of controls (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
Table 5: Migration Across District Boundaries
% of Moves towards Neighboring Districts
Districts of Origin Mean St. Dev.
Xhosa 266 34.7 33.5
Zulu 229 28.3 30
Sotho 238 33.2 28.3
Swazi 116 29 34.5
Tswana 162 32.7 34.4
Tsonga 128 31.1 32.1
Venda 77 31.9 37.5
Notes. The Table shows separately for each ethnic group the per-
centage of movers in between 1991 and 1996 which are estimated to
relocate in neighboring districts with respect to the one of origin.
(Sources: Statistics South Africa 1998).
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Change in Polarization Measure ∆ELPWB
∆E˜LPWB 0.244 0.244 0.249 0.25
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F-stat 17.13 17.13 17.60 17.60
robust F-stat 14.82 16.07
2nd Stage Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events
∆ÊLPWB 13.438 13.438 12.074 12.074
(7.10) (5.85) (6.95) (5.28)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.121 -0.121 -0.117 -0.117
(0.46) (0.26) (0.50) (0.28)
∆ Population (log) 0.361 0.361 2.640 2.640
(0.83) (0.76) (5.54) (6.15)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.252 -0.252 -0.243 -0.243
(0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.24)
Constant -0.969 -0.969 -2.822 -2.822
(0.32) (0.29) (2.12) (1.75)
Economic Controls N N Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-stage and second-stage instrumental variable
estimates of the first-difference baseline model. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which
information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD in between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB
is the district-level within-black polarization measure. The total number of blacks and total population,
and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in both the first and second stage in (1) and
(2), while all other economic controls are included in (3) and (4). First-difference residuals are assumed to
be homoskedastic in columns (1) and (3), and heteroskedastic in (2) and (4), where Eicker-Huber-White
robust standard errors (White 1980) are estimated (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics South Africa
1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
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Table 7: Instrumental Variable Falsification (I)
Instrument: Within-black Polarization in 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Change in Polarization Measure ∆ELPWB
ELP1991,WB -0.159 -0.159 -0.156 -0.156
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
F-stat 30.52 30.52 28 28
2nd Stage Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events
∆ÊLPWB 2.862 2.862 3.461 3.461
(5.25) (5.72) (5.45) (5.16)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.329 -0.329 -0.377 -0.377
(0.44) (0.22) (0.47) (0.30)
∆ Population (log) -0.098 -0.098 6.045 6.045
(0.78) (0.65) (5.16) (6.51)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.286 -0.286 -0.238 -0.238
(0.16) (0.27) (0.16) (0.25)
Constant -0.853 -0.853 -3.942 -3.942
(0.30) (0.25) (2.00) (1.87)
Economic Controls N N Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-stage and second-stage instrumental variable
estimates of the first-difference baseline model. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which
information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB
is the district-level within-black polarization measure. The total number of blacks and total population,
and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in both the first and second stage in (1) and
(2), while all other economic controls are included in (3) and (4). First-difference residuals are assumed to
be homoskedastic in columns (1) and (3), and heteroskedastic in (2) and (4), where Eicker-Huber-White
robust standard errors (White, 1980) are estimated (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics South Africa,
1991, 1998; NOOA, 2012).
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Table 8: Instrumental Variable Falsification (II)
Instrument: Average Within-black Polarization in Neighboring Districts in 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Change in Polarization Measure ∆ELPWB
ELP−i 1991,WB -0.042 -0.042 -0.034 -0.033
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
F-stat 1.21 2.05 0.73 1.35
2nd Stage Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events
∆ÊLPWB -18.736 -18.736 -18.581 -18.581
(33.28) (28.43) (42.36) (36.50)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.752 -0.752 -1.044 -1.044
(0.86) (0.86) (1.40) (1.36)
∆ Population (log) -1.037 -1.037 14.758 14.758
(1.75) (1.75) (17.83) (16.95)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.355 -0.355 -0.227 -0.227
(0.23) (0.38) (0.21) (0.30)
Constant -0.615 -0.615 -6.806 -6.806
(0.54) (0.42) (6.02) (5.58)
Economic Controls N N Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-stage and second-stage instrumental variable
estimates of the first-difference baseline model. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which
information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB
is the district-level within-black polarization measure. The total number of blacks and total population,
and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in both the first and second stage in (1) and
(2), while all other economic controls are included in (3) and (4). First-difference residuals are assumed to
be homoskedastic in columns (1) and (3), and heteroskedastic in (2) and (4), where Eicker-Huber-White
robust standard errors (White, 1980) are estimated (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics South Africa,
1991, 1998; NOOA, 2012).
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Table 9: Instrumental Variable Falsification (III)
Instruments: Within-black Polarization in 1991 and
Average Within-black Polarization in Neighboring Districts in 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Change in Polarization Measure ∆ELPWB
ELP1991,WB -0.324 -0.324 -0.316 -0.316
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
ELP−i 1991,WB 0.270 0.270 0.268 0.269
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
F-stat 28.76 15.72 27.03 15.38
2nd Stage Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events
∆ÊLPWB 6.323 6.323 6.264 6.264
(3.96) (5.72) (4.08) (5.52)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.261 -0.261 -0.293 -0.293
(0.43) (0.20) (0.45) (0.25)
∆ Population (log) 0.052 0.052 4.937 4.937
(0.76) (0.63) (4.95) (6.41)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.275 -0.275 -0.240 -0.240
(0.16) (0.25) (0.16) (0.25)
Constant -0.891 -0.891 -3.577 -3.577
(0.30) (0.25) (1.94) (1.83)
Economic Controls N N Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-stage and second-stage instrumental variable
estimates of the first-difference baseline model. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which
information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB
is the district-level within-black polarization measure. The total number of blacks and total population,
and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in both the first and second stage in (1) and
(2), while all other economic controls are included in (3) and (4). First-difference residuals are assumed to
be homoskedastic in columns (1) and (3), and heteroskedastic in (2) and (4), where Eicker-Huber-White
robust standard errors (White, 1980) are estimated (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics South Africa,
1991, 1998; NOOA, 2012).
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Table 10: Instrumental Variable Falsification (IV)
Dependent Variable: Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events 1989-1991
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage Change in Polarization Measure ∆ELPWB
∆E˜LPWB 0.244 0.244 0.249 0.25
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F-stat 17.13 17.13 17.60 17.60
2nd Stage Change in Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events 1989-1991
∆ÊLPWB -3.982 -4.506 -4.080 -4.080
(6.12) (4.54) (4.96) (3.84)
∆ Blacks (log) 0.202 0.191 0.273 0.273
(0.40) (0.21) (0.43) (0.25)
∆ Population (log) 0.026 0.003 -2.223 -2.223
(0.71) (0.89) (4.69) (4.73)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) 0.046 0.044 0.032 0.032
(0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.26)
Constant 0.100 0.106 0.671 0.671
(0.27) (0.17) (1.82) (1.86)
Economic Controls N N Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-stage and second-stage instrumental variable
estimates of the first-difference baseline model. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which
information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in the total number of non-
state conflict events coded in the MD between 1989 and 1991 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ∆ELPWB is the
district-level change in within-black polarization measure between 1991 and 1996. The total number of blacks
and total population, and night-time satellite light value in logs are used as controls in both the first and
second stage in (1) and (2), while all other economic controls are included in (3) and (4). First-difference
residuals are assumed to be homoskedastic in columns (1) and (3), and heteroskedastic in (2) and (4), where
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors (White, 1980) are estimated (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5; Statistics
South Africa, 1991, 1998; NOOA, 2012).
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Figure 1: Conflict and Migration in Contemporary South Africa
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Figure 1a. The figure plots the total number of conflict events in South Africa from
1989 to 2004. Non-state conflict events refer to struggles between black-dominated
groups, while one-side conflict events are those in which the Government is involved.
The data are described in details in the Data section (Source: UCDP-GED).
Figure 1b. The figure plots the migration rates in South Africa from 1955 to 1999. Source:
South Africa Migration and Health Survey (SAMHS), Reed 2013.
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Figure 2: Map of Bantustans
Notes. Map of Bantustans in South Africa as of 1986 (produced by the
U.S. CIA. Source: University of Texas at Austin 1986).
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Figure 3: Map of Magisterial Districts in South Africa
MDs in both 1991 and 1996 Samples
MDs in 1996 Sample Only
Map of Magisterial Districts in South Africa
Notes. Map of Magisterial Districts in South Africa, indicating in dark grey those we
for which information can be retreived from both the 1991 and 1996 Census (Statistics
South Africa 1991, 1998). Those Bantustans which were already granted independence
are not covered by the 1991 Census of the Republic of South Africa (Source: authors’
elaboration using Stata).
Figure 4: Ethnic Group Populations per District: Changes 1991-1996
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Change in Ethnic Group Population Shares over Initial Share of Blacks
Notes. The figure shows the change in population share of each ethnolinguistic group at the district level plotted over
the initial share of blacks. Observations are districts for which we are able to retrieve information consistently from
both 1991 and 1996 Census (Source: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998). This excludes districts in the apartheid
homelands which were granted independence and were no longer part of the Republic of South Africa. Observations
are averaged per bins of share of blacks of size 2.5%.
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Figure 5: Change in Conflict and Initial Polarization
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Within-black Ethnolinguistic Polarization 1991
The figure plots the change in the total number of non-state conflict events between
1991 and 1996 over the levels of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in the same
district in 1991 (Source: UCDP-GED; Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
Figure 6: Change in Conflict and Initial Polarization in Neighboring Districts
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Avg. Within-black ELP in Neighboring Districts in 1991
The figure plots the change in the total number of non-state conflict events between
1991 and 1996 over the average levels of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization
in neighboring district in 1991 (Source: UCDP-GED; Statistics South Africa 1991,
1998).
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A Appendix
Table A.1: One-sided and Non-state Conflict events: 1989-1998
Gov. Repression Non-state Conflicts
Year Conflict Events Est. Deaths Conflict Events Est. Deaths
1989 34 54 185 226
1990 147 195 399 1243
1991 48 49 385 657
1992 61 61 479 665
1993 73 67 415 643
1994 16 14 230 444
1995 0 0 39 143
1996 0 0 37 156
1997 0 0 20 30
1998 0 0 23 44
1999 0 0 11 19
2000 0 0 1 0
2002 3 2 0 0
2004 0 0 4 0
2010 1 1 0 0
Notes. The Table shows the total number of One-sided and Non-state conflict
events per year in South Africa recorded in the geo-referenced Event Dataset of
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP-GED v1.5) which we are able to map
into MDs, together with the estimated total number of deaths.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Year 1991
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Non-state Conflict Events 1.271 5.192 0 41 303
ELPWB 0.368 0.336 0 0.989 296
Blacks 72.418 110.795 0 972.838 299
Population 103.67 156.61 3.04 1546.067 299
Rural Population 44.876 76.325 0 419.321 299
No Education 29.879 37.919 1.136 253.145 299
Unemployed 7.194 15.502 0.034 189.362 299
Night-time Lights 4.133 12.79 0 63 354
Accessibility 2.04 0.762 1 4 351
Ruggedness 2.249 1.448 0.237 6.538 354
Slope Index 73.009 22.623 13 99 351
Panel B: Year 1996
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Non-state Conflict Events 0.105 0.692 0 6 354
ELPWB 0.34 0.332 0 0.997 350
Blacks 87.97 109.609 0 896.042 354
Population 114.63 139.528 3.557 902.861 354
Rural Population 53.123 73.148 0 404.352 354
No Education 21.674 23.123 0.929 137.231 354
Unemployed 13.403 20.166 0.214 189.748 354
Night-time Lights 4.816 13.26 0 63 354
Panel C: Difference 1991-1996
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Non-state Conflict Events -1.044 4.9 -41 6 298
ELPWB 0.002 0.177 -0.889 0.997 294
Blacks 3.541 69.902 -665.71 338.236 298
Population 2.752 78.429 -788.692 347.736 298
Rural Population -2.697 40.793 -224.642 175.135 298
No Education -10.822 23.11 -195.972 52.845 298
Unemployed 4.695 12.893 -118.249 78.861 298
Night-time Lights 0.785 3.15 -15 29 298
Notes. Data for Blacks, Population, Rural Population, No Education, Unemployed, Not
Economically Active and Citizens of South Africa are in thousands. All variables are
discussed in Section 3 (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998;
Nunn and Puga 2012; IIASA/FAO 2012; NOOA 2012).
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Table A.3: First-difference Estimation: Within-blach Group Shares as Controls
Change in Total No. of Non-state Conflict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ELPWB 6.499 4.961 5.403 5.362 5.174 5.215 5.234
(1.68) (1.64) (1.78) (1.68) (1.66) (1.68) (1.66)
∆ Sh. XhosaWB 10.865
(3.40)
∆ Sh. ZuluWB -13.569
(4.31)
∆ Sh. SothoWB -1.503
(4.22)
∆ Sh. SwaziWB -7.346
(9.80)
∆ Sh. TswanaWB -1.648
(4.64)
∆ Sh. TsongaWB 1.114
(7.38)
∆ Sh. VendaWB 32.563
(46.68)
∆ Blacks (log) -1.299 -0.323 -0.441 -0.342 -0.342 -0.325 -0.328
(0.54) (0.44) (0.55) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
∆ Population (log) 4.485 5.612 5.312 5.213 5.265 5.347 5.301
(4.73) (4.73) (4.81) (4.81) (4.82) (4.81) (4.81)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.240 -0.229 -0.242 -0.237 -0.237 -0.239 -0.242
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
∆ Rural Population (log) -0.682 -0.704 -0.684 -0.681 -0.679 -0.683 -0.685
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
∆ No Education (log) -1.267 -1.285 -1.018 -0.937 -1.037 -1.022 -0.904
(1.73) (1.73) (1.76) (1.76) (1.76) (1.76) (1.76)
∆ Unemployed (log) 0.077 0.056 -0.090 -0.165 -0.120 -0.114 -0.111
(0.82) (0.82) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83)
Constant -3.314 -4.042 -3.631 -3.696 -3.731 -3.722 -3.839
(1.88) (1.88) (1.93) (1.91) (1.91) (1.91) (1.92)
Other Economic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.127 0.126 0.096 0.098 0.096 0.096 0.097
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-difference coefficients estimates. The unit of observation is a MD
in South Africa for which information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD in between 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ∆ELPWB is the district-level
change in within-black polarization measure. For each black ethnolinguistic group, ∆Sh. GroupWB is the change in the
within-black share of that group. Other controls are defined as in the data section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998;
NOOA 2012). All estimates are derived assuming homoskedastic difference residuals.
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Figure A.1: Ethnic Group Populations per District: Changes 1991-1996
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Change in Ethnic Group Population Shares over Initial Shares
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Change in Ethnic Group Population Shares over Initial Share of Other Groups
Notes. The top graphs in the figure show the change in population share of each of the three biggest ethnolinguistic
groups at the district level plotted over the initial share of each group. The bottom graphs plot instead the changes for the
two biggest groups, Xhosa and Zulu, over the population share of the other in 1991. Observations are districts for which
we are able to retrieve information consistently from both 1991 and 1996 Census (Source: Statistics South Africa 1991,
1998). This excludes districts in the apartheid homelands which were granted independence and were no longer part of
the Republic of South Africa. Observations are averaged per bins of share of blacks of size 2.5%. Taking these figures and
Figure 4 together, a few patterns emerge. Districts where the population share of the Zulu ethnolinguistic group grew the
most between 1991 and 1996 are those were both the Zulu population share and the share of blacks in 1991 were large but
not close to one. According to the bottom graphs, the Xhosa population share was very low in 1991 in these same districts.
The Zulu group population seems thus to increase more than proportionally in those districts with a relevant presence of
non-black population, and where the Zulu themselves were already a large share of the population. Similarly, looking at
changes in the Xhosa population shares, these seem to be disproportionally more positive in those districts where the Zulu
group population share was low in 1991, and more negative otherwise. Again, the most important changes in absolute
terms seem to be observed where non-black population shares were positive in 1991.
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Figure A.2: Change in Conflict and Initial Within-black Shares
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The figure plots the change in the total number of non-state conflict events between 1991 and 1996 over
the within-black share of each ethnolinguistic group in 1991 (Source: UCDP-GED; Statistics South Africa
1991, 1998).
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Figure A.3: Change in Conflict and Initial Within-black Shares in Neighboring
Districts
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
WB Share of Venda in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
WB Share of Tsonga in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
WB Share of Sotho in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
WB Share of Tswana in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
WB Share of Swazi in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
WB Share of Zulu in Neighboring Districts 1991
-4
0-
30
-2
0-
10
0
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
WB Share of Xhosa in Neighboring Districts 1991
The figure plots the change in the total number of non-state conflict events between 1991 and 1996 over the
average within-black share of each ethnolinguistic group in neighboring districts in 1991 (Source: UCDP-
GED; Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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B Appendix for Online Publication
B.1 Poisson Model Estimation Results
Table B.1: Poisson Model, 1991 Cross-sectional Estimation
Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ELPWB 2.542 3.747 3.749 3.863 3.947
(0.20) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.37)
Blacks (log) 0.512 0.517 0.631 0.151
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.35)
Population (log) -0.083 -0.095 -0.167 -2.921
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (1.20)
Night-time Lights (log) 0.005 -0.054 -0.115
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Rural Population (log) 0.050
(0.02)
No Education (log) 0.695
(0.39)
Unemployed (log) 1.459
(0.31)
Constant -3.105 -6.736 -6.631 -20.579 -19.571
(0.51) (0.83) (0.93) (834.81) (1443.28)
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls N N N Y Y
Other Economic Controls N N N N Y
Observations 294 294 294 291 291
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports Poisson model coefficients estimates from the 1991
cross-sectional specification. The unit of observation is a MD in South Africa for which information is available
in 1991. The dependent variable is the total number of non-state conflict events coded in the MD in 1991 in the
UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB is the district-level within-black polarization measure. Other controls are defined as
in the data section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; Nunn and Puga 2012; IIASA/FAO 2012; NOOA
2012).
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Table B.2: Poisson Model, Fixed-Effect Estimation
Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events
(1) (2) (3)
ELPWB 5.814 17.129 24.092
(2.35) (5.38) (8.14)
Blacks (log) -4.149 -5.645
(1.19) (1.60)
Population (log) 6.182 4.175
(1.45) (4.44)
Night-time Lights (log) -0.458 -0.456
(0.27) (0.29)
Rural Population (log) -0.073
(0.08)
No Education (log) -2.426
(1.84)
Unemployed (log) 0.097
(1.21)
Constant -2.076 -2.108 -4.958
(0.19) (0.24) (2.48)
Other Economic Controls N N Y
Observations 94 94 94
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports coefficients estimates from a fixed-effects Poisson
model. With two time periods only (1991 and 1996), estimates from a first-difference linear regression
model are equivalent to the ones of a fixed-effects linear regression model. Estimation is performed over
those MDs for which a positive number of non-state conflict events is observed in at least one of the
two considered year. The dependent variable is the total number of non-state conflict events coded in
the MD in the year in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB is the district-level within-black polarization
measure. Other controls are defined as in the data section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998;
NOOA 2012).
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B.2 Conditional Logit Estimation Results
Table B.3: Conditional Logit Estimation
Migrant from i is observed in j
Distance between i and j (km) -0.009
(5.31× 10−6)
Observations 894’758’631
Pseudo R2 0.21
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports the estimated coefficient of the
distance variable for the Conditional Logit Model in equation (5) in the text. The number
of observations is given by multiplying the number of migrants as recorded in the 1996
Census (Statistics South Africa 1998) for the total number of MDs they had the option to
locate in (353).
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B.3 Governmental Repression as Control
Table B.4: 1991 Cross-sectional Estimation
Total Number of Non-state Conflict Events 1991
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ELPWB 2.120 2.145 2.155 2.107 2.073
(0.99) (1.01) (1.01) (1.02) (1.08)
Gov. Repression 3.335 3.305 3.311 3.280 3.369
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50)
Blacks (log) -0.032 -0.041 -0.296 -0.098
(0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.48)
Population (log) 0.171 0.199 0.453 -3.744
(0.48) (0.51) (0.55) (3.64)
Night-time Lights (log) -0.020 -0.038 -0.052
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Rural Population (log) -0.027
(0.12)
No Education (log) -1.044
(1.53)
Unemployed (log) 0.355
(0.69)
Constant -0.446 -2.015 -2.303 -0.258 0.198
(0.68) (2.96) (3.38) (4.22) (4.89)
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Geographic Controls N N N Y Y
Other Economic Controls N N N N Y
Observations 294 294 294 291 291
R2 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.319 0.329
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports Ordinary Least Squares coefficients
estimates from the 1991 cross-sectional specification. The unit of observation is a MD in South
Africa for which information is available in 1991. The dependent variable is the total number of
non-state conflict events coded in the MD in 1991 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB is the
district-level within-black polarization measure. Governmental repression is measured counting
in each MD the total number of one-sided conflict events recorded in the UGDP-GED database
where the Government is involved against civilians. Other controls are defined as in the data
section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; Nunn and Puga 2012; IIASA/FAO 2012;
NOOA 2012).
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Table B.5: First-difference Estimation
Change in Total No. of Non-state Conflict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ELPWB 5.175 4.787 4.309 4.309 3.642
(1.47) (1.50) (1.51) (2.79) (1.33)
∆ Gov. Repression 3.285 3.296 3.575 3.575 2.560
(0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (1.58) (0.42)
Non-state Conf 89-90 -0.233
(0.03)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.171 -0.286 -0.286 -0.213
(0.40) (0.41) (0.26) (0.36)
∆ Population (log) -0.184 -1.386 -1.386 -4.725
(0.69) (4.45) (7.63) (3.92)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.289 -0.254 -0.254 -0.156
(0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13)
∆ Rural Population (log) -0.718 -0.718 -0.448
(0.20) (0.24) (0.18)
∆ No Education (log) -2.143 -2.143 -0.498
(1.60) (1.99) (1.41)
∆ Unemployed (log) -0.646 -0.646 -0.493
(0.76) (0.52) (0.67)
Constant -0.586 -0.391 -2.647 -2.647 -0.879
(0.27) (0.28) (1.74) (1.75) (1.54)
Other Economic Controls N N Y Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.191 0.204 0.255 0.255 0.430
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-difference coefficients estimates. The unit
of observation is a MD in South Africa for which information is available in both periods. The dependent
variable is the change in total number of non-state conflict events coded in the MD in between 1991 and
1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB is the district-level within-black polarization measure. Non-
state Conf 89-90 is the total number of conflict events coded in the MD in 1989-1990. Governmental
repression is measured counting in each MD the total number of one-sided conflict events recorded in the
UGDP-GED database where the Government is involved against civilians. Other controls are defined as
in the data section (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012). (1), (2), (3) and (5) are
first-difference estimates assuming homoskedastic difference residuals; those in (4) are first-difference
estimates assuming heteroskedastic difference residuals.
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B.4 Conflict-related Deaths as Alternative Measure of Conflict Incidence
Table B.6: First-difference Estimation
Change in Total No. of Non-state Conflict Deaths 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ELPWB 8.660 8.660 8.259 8.259 5.900
(3.71) (4.80) (3.83) (4.77) (3.03)
Est. Deaths 89-90 -0.246
(0.02)
∆ Blacks (log) -0.632 -0.632 -0.494 -0.494 -0.490
(0.98) (0.45) (1.03) (0.50) (0.81)
∆ Population (log) 0.332 0.332 7.448 7.448 -4.767
(1.71) (1.42) (11.07) (9.63) (8.79)
∆ Night-time Lights (log) -0.834 -0.834 -0.800 -0.800 -0.413
(0.36) (0.63) (0.37) (0.61) (0.29)
∆ Rural Population (log) -0.571 -0.571 0.295
(0.51) (0.27) (0.41)
∆ No Education (log) -0.238 -0.238 1.314
(4.04) (4.29) (3.19)
∆ Unemployed (log) 1.138 1.138 0.047
(1.92) (1.18) (1.52)
Constant -1.012 -1.012 -8.046 -8.046 -2.699
(0.68) (0.57) (4.40) (3.88) (3.50)
Other Economic Controls N N Y Y Y
Observations 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.042 0.042 0.056 0.056 0.414
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports first-difference coefficients estimates. The unit of observation
is a MD in South Africa for which information is available in both periods. The dependent variable is the change in total
number of deaths in non-state conflict events coded in the MD in 1991 and 1996 in the UCDP-GED dataset. ELPWB
is the district-level within-black polarization measure. Est. Deaths 89-90 is the total number of deaths in non-state
conflict events coded in the MD in 1989-1990. Other controls are defined as in the data section (Sources: Statistics
South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012). (1), (2), (3) and (5) are first-difference estimates assuming homoskedastic
difference residuals; those in (4) are first-difference estimates assuming heteroskedastic difference residuals.
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B.5 Ethnolinguistic Information
Figure B.1: The Ethnologue Tree of Native Ethnolinguistic Groups in South
Africa
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Source: Lewis (2009).
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Abstract
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between pre-colonial ethnic centralization
and contemporary development in Latin America at sub-national level. Using historical
ethnic homelands as units of observation, we find a strong positive correlation between pre-
colonial institutions and levels of development today, as measured by light per capita. This
finding is robust to the inclusion of local geographical factors and other pre-colonial ob-
servable characteristics (e.g. pre-colonial population density). We argue that this long-term
effect relies on the influence played by pre-colonial institutions in shaping early colonial
activities in Latin America. To test this hypothesis, we employ a new georeferenced dataset
on Spanish American colonial treasuries - Cajas Reales - as a proxy for colonial state ca-
pacity. We document a strong positive effect of pre-colonial institutions on sub-national
colonial institutions. We interpret this as evidence of a direct link between pre-colonial
institutions, colonial institutional arrangement and contemporary economic development.
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1
1 Introduction
Several contributions had shed lights on the role of early development on contemporary development.
At the same time, a growing body of the economic literature has started to focus on the positive effect
of state capacity for economic perfermance. This paper studies the long-term effect of pre-colonial state
capacity at local level in Latin America.
This paper provides a new empirical framework to study the historical deep rooted factors of regional de-
velopment in Latin America. The starting point for the analysis is the digitalization of the series of maps
contained in Murdock 1951. Using the ethnic homelands as unit of observations, we match to each ethnic
group the corresponding entry in the Ethnographic Atlas (EA from now on) (Murdock 1967) containing
socio-economic and cultural information on selected ethnic groups. In order to increase the sample nu-
merosity we rely on narratives from Murdock 1951 containing comparable information to those of the
EA. Following Gennaioli and Rainer 2007 and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, we relates pre-
colonial centralization and levels of development today, as measured by light per capita. As preliminary
analysis, we document the existence of a strong and positive effect of pre-colonial centralization on light
per capita. The effect is sizable. Results are robust to the inclusion of several geographical and location
characteristics. We exploit within country variabily in order to take into account country-specific unob-
servable characteristics. At the same time, we digitize the so called Intendecias - sub-national colonial
administrative units - and we assign them to each corresponding ethnic group. To achive identification,
we thus rely on the within-country within-intendency variation in both pre-colonial centralization and
light per capita.
The relationship we find might be biased by unobservable factors at pre-colonial time. In order to ad-
dress this concern we show that the effect of pre-colonial centralization on light per capita holds when
controlling for a set of pre-colonial observable characteristics (e.g. pre-colonial population density). We
then turn the analysis at more disaggregated pixel level of analysis in order to show that our findings are
stable to a finer set of geographic controls. Using a 0,125x0,125 degree pixel level resolution we show
that our results are confirmed.
We then turn to investigate a possibile channel operating between pre-colonial centralization and re-
gional development today. The impact of colonial activities in Latin America is undeniable Dell, 2010.
Recent contributions started to investigate the determinants of sub-national colonial activieties (Arias
and Girod 2011). We suggest that the long-term effect of pre-colonial centraliziation on regional devel-
opment relies on the influence played by the former in shaping early colonial activities in Latin America.
The ideal institution to study the determinants and the consequences of local colonial activities should
be highly decentralized and operating on a well-defined terroritorial basis. We georeference a novel
dataset on Spanish American colonial treasuries - Cajas Reales. Given its tax colletcion function, we
present this institution as a proxy for subnational colonial state capacity. We show that pre-colonial
centralization is strongly correlated with the presence of Cajas Reales in a given location. We interpret
this as evidence of a direct link between pre-colonial institutions, colonial institutional arrangement and
contemporary economic development.
2
2 Data
2.1 Spatial Distribution of Pre-Colonial Ethnic Homelands
The first step for the creation of the dataset is the ditigitalization of the series of Ethnolinguistic Maps
contained in George Peter Murdock’s (1951, 1967). In his work, Murdock 1951 maps the spatial distri-
bution of pre-colonial ethnic homelands in Central and South America as well in Mexico. Murdock’s
work represents the best attempt to map the spatial distribution of the pre-colonial ethnic homeland at
the eve of European colonization1. The ethnolingustic maps are presented following the modern country
divisions. For each country in Central and South America we have a map depicting the geographical dis-
tribution of its respective pre-colonial ethnic groups. Geographic coordinates are assigned to each single
map facilitating the spatial aggregation of different maps. In Murdock and O’Leary 1975, the whole
continental North America is mapped. I digitize this map and clip it, keeping only the ethnic homelands
belonging to the actual borders of Mexico, with the one of Central and South America’s map. Finally
we are able to retrieve 330 ethnic homelands for Latin America.
[Figure 1]
2.2 Ethnic Characteristics
Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) provides several information on ethnic-level cultural, geographic,
and socio-economic characteristics of 1270 ethnicities around the world. Using the updated version of
the Ethnographic Atlas (Gray 1999), I match 121 ethnic groups to 95 ethnic homelands in Latin America.
Latin America is characterized by a paucity of ethnic information retrievable from the Ethnographic At-
las (Nunn, Alesina, and Giuliano 2013; Michalopoulos 2012). To solve this limitation, I digitize ethnic
narratives from Murdock (1951). reports a short description of each ethnic homelands’ ethnographic in-
formation. Using these narratives,I follow the coding procedure of the Ethnographic Atlas (Gray 1999).
This procedure allows me to increase the sample dimension for Central and South America from 40 to
50 %2.
As a measure of pre-colonial state capacity I use the ”Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local Com-
munity” index as derived from the procedure described above. This variable identifies the political
jurisdictional structure above the local community level for each society. In order words, this index
1”[..] data always pertain to the period of earliest European contact unless otherwise explicitly stated” pag 3
2In Appendix are reported all the information regardin this procedure
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measures the degree of political complexity of pre-colonial villages’ network. The degree of political
centralization ranges from 0 to 4. At the bottom of the classification are the statless societies lacking
any form of political organization. A score of 1 is assigned to petty chiefdoms; a score of 2 identifies
paramount chiefdoms; and 3 and 4 are the scores assigned to ethnic homelands characterized by pre-
modern states as political ogranization3. Figure 2 shows the variation in the distribution of pre-colonial
centralization across ethnic homelands in Latin America.
[Figure 2]
2.3 Satellite Night Light
We are interested in measuring regional development at the highest resolution as possible. A growing
body of the literature on comparative development uses luminosity data from the Defense and Metere-
ological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System. (DMPS-OLS). DMPS-OLS records satellite
images of the earth at night. The satellite detects lights from human settlements, fires, gas flares, light-
ning, and the aurora. The measure is a six-digit number (rangin from 0 to 63). The high resolution of
the satellite images (1km x 1km) makes them particularly valuable for the porpuse of this study. We
construct average light density for the period 2008-2012 averaging across pixels at the level of our unit
of observation.
We then construct additional measures of regional development as captured by luminosity at night. In
order to cope with the blooming problem, we use all the available data on luminosity from the DMPS-
OLS to construct an avarage light density measure for the period 1992-2012 (Ashraf, Galor, and Klemp
2014). If blooming problem was due to a particular yearly climatic condition, this procedure should
mitigate the issue. As an additional measure of regional development, we construct a measure of light
per capita for the period 2008-2012 (Pinkovskiy 2013; Ashraf, Galor, and Klemp 2014).
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
To study the relationship between pre-colonial centralization and contemporary regional development
across ethnic homeland, we estimate the following specification:
yi,c,d = a0 + ac + ad + βCentri +Xi,c,dΨ + λPDi,c,d + i,c,d. (1)
3It is worth to notice that a main difference between my classification and the classification of the Ethnographic Atlas is that
in Murdock (1957) the ethnographic information are usually reported at the ethnic homeland level; while in the Ethnographic
Atlas, ethnographic information are provided at the ethnic group level. Several ethnic groups may be present in the same ethnic
homeland. This may in part explain the differences in the coding. In the Appendix the reader will find a clear exposition of
this issue.
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The dependent variable yi,c,d captures the level of regional development in country i in intendency d, as
proxied by light intensity. Centri is the local ethnic centralization following the degree of the jurisdic-
tional hierarchy beyond the local level. If the ethnicity is split by a country or intendency border, each
partition is assigned to the corresponding country c or intedency d. Almost all specification includes
country fixed effect (ac) and intendency fixed effect (ad) in order to exploit the within-country within-
intendency variation. This procedure may magnify the measurument error problem absorbing a sizable
part of the overall variation. Nevertheless we are willing to trade this problem with the chance of ruling
out potential unobservable characteristic both at the country level (e.g. quality of national institutions)
and at the intendency level (local-specific colonial policies - Mita system).
Results in Table 1 unconver a positive and significant relation between pre-colonial institutions and
regional development today. The effect is stable across several specification in which we control for
several geographic and location characteristics. Results hold when we control for pre-colonial proxy of
development (population density in 1492).
3.1 Inference
There are at least two important dimensions on which serial correlation should be accounted for. The
first one is the ethnolinguistic family to which an ethnic group belong to. It can be the case that inside the
same ethnolinguistic family the pre-colonial institution is not randomly distributed. In all specification
we cluster the standard error at the ethnolinguistic family level as derived by the level 1 of the Ethnologue
family tree. The number of cluster on this dimension is 67. Another source of potential serial correlation
is the country dimension. Notice that the number of country is 19 (15 in the Spanish American sample).
This makes inference based on the cluster dimension unreliable. In order to try to mitigate this issue,
we offer three different solution. First, we first clusterize standard errors at the country-ethnolinguistic
level. Secondly, we allow our standard error to be spatially serially correlated and we implement a
Conley’s correction procedure 4. Finally, in order to be as conservative as possibile, we estimate a
linear regressions with multi-way clustered standard errors (both at the country and ethnolinguistic level)
bootstrapped for one cluster dimension (country level) 5.
4 Pre-Colonial Omitted Variable
The relationship between pre-colonial centralization and contemporary regional development today
might be affected by other characteristics at pre-colonial time. If one of these characteristics is corre-
lated with both the pre-colonial centralization and luminosity in 2008-2012 this may lead to an omitted
variable problem for our estimates. In order to mitigate this issue we try to show that other pre-colonial
4michalopoulos2012 show that Conley correction for spatial correlation is similar to a double clustering at the country and
ethnolinguistic level.
5We use the STATA command cgmwildboot as written by ?. Note that this last procedure does not provide standard errors.
It returns a p-value to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of interest is not different from 0.
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characteristics are not correlated with contemporary regional development today. When such correla-
tion is present, we them show that, conditioning on these variables, pre-colonial centralization is still an
important predictor of regional development.
[Table ]
In columns A we test light density on the ethnic-level variables controlling for country and intendency
fixed effects. The general trend is that almost all pre-colonial characteristics are insignificant. In columns
B we add the our pre-colonial centralization and we want to see whether the correlation with regional
development conditional is driven by other ethnic traits. Reassuringly, The coefficient of the pre-colonial
centralization enters positive and significant in all specifications.
5 Channels of Persistence
Previous findings unconver a positive correlation between pre-colonial centralization and contemporary
level of regional development in Latin America. What can be the mechanism behind this long-term
effect? In this section we argue that this empirical regularity may rely on the influence played by pre-
colonial centralization in shaping early colonial activities in Latin America. The idea is that pre-colonial
structure and political complexity altered the incentives of colonizers in their settling decisions. The
existence of complexed societies should lower the cost of setting an institution in a particular place
if some elements of that institutions (e.g. tributes) were already present in that place. Acting as a
cost-reducing factor, highly centralized pre-colonial societies facilitates the formation of colonial state
presence. Along with its extractive nature, colonial state presence is related to provision of local public
good - like roads - and to higher fiscal capacity. This directly links pre-colonial centralization, colonial
institutional arrangement and contemporary regional economic development.
5.1 Caja Reales
In order to test this conjecture, we employ a novel dataset on sub-national colonial institutions, namely
Cajas Reales. Cajas Reales were sub-national treasury offices with the task of tax collection in a unique,
well-defined geographic area. Anytime a new political unit was established a Caja Real was created too.
The ”system consisted of a network of quasi autonomous interdependent fiscal districts and authorities”
(Irigoin and Grafe 2008). Though organized in a hierarchical system 6, local officials were responsible
for ”gathering and spending royal revenues”. This generates regional differences in both fiscal capac-
ity and local investement in public goods. In fact, the main task of the centralized authority survising
the regional cajas was to eliminate regional differences and to try to homogenize administritive practices.
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We take adavantage of the seminal contributon TePaske 1982, 1990 collected data on Caja Reales for
the period 1520-1800. We focus on the sub-sample of the Cajas Reales as digitized by . Moreover,
we include cajas for Colombia (Jaramillo, Meisel, and Urrutia 2006) and Venezuela (Garcı´a 1991). We
match the name of each caja real to the corresponding contemporary city in order to obtain latitude and
longitude information. With this procedure, we are able to retrieve information on 90 local treasuries
location. We overalap the ethnic-country-intendencia with the caja reales in our database. We then count
the number of caja reales that are contained in each ethnic-country-intendencia. This variable will be
our proxy for colonial state presenceat subnational level. Figure shows the spatial destribution of cajas
reales in Latin America.
[Figure ]
5.2 Pre-Colonial Centralization and Colonial State Presence
We want to test whether the degree of pre-colonial centralization correlates with colonial state presence
at sub-national level, as proxied by the presence of at least one caja real. For this reason, we adopt the
following specification:
Coloniale,i,c = α+ βJurisdictionale + γZe,i,c + φEe,i,c + µc + µi + e,i,c (2)
The dependent variable Coloniale,i,c captures the number of CajaReal in ethnic homeland e in in-
tendency i in country e. Jurisdictionale is the local pre-colonial ethnic centralization following the
degree of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level in ethnic group e. As before, if the ethnicity
is split by a country or intendency border, each partition is assigned to the corresponding country c or
intedency d. In almost all specification, we include country fixed effect (ac) and intendenc fixed effect
(ad) in order to exploit the within-country within-intendency variation. In several specification we con-
trol for land endowments (elevation and area under water), ecological features (a malaria stability index,
land suitability for agriculture, precipitation, temperature), and natural resources (diamond mines and
petroleum fields). We then include a set of location control of each ethnic homeland in each country
in each intendency. We include for each ethnic group distance from its centroids to the corresponding
country capital, country border, closest major river, and closest coast.
Results in Table 3 show a positive and significant effect of pre-colonial institutions on subnational colo-
nial institutions. The effect is stable across several specification controlling for a rich set of geographical
and location characteristics. This evidence is consistent with the view that pre-colonial early institutions
shaped colonial strategy and affecting current development today.
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6 Tables and Figures
Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Homelands in Latin America
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Figure 2. Ethnic Pre-Colonial Centralization in Latin America
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Figure 2. Ethnic Pre-Colonial Centralization in Latin America
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Table 1: Pre-Colonial Ethnic Centralization and Regional Development
Light per capita in 2012 (log)
Latin America Full Sample
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.253 0.298 0.247 0.240 0.192 0.144
Double Cluster S.E. (0.079) (0.112) (0.071) (0.073) (0.067) (0.064)
Conley S.E. [0.112] [0.079] [0.063] [0.061] [0.053] [0.050]
R2 0.058 0.230 0.542 0.565 0.629 0.679
N 486 486 486 486 486 486
Spanish America Sample
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.249 0.292 0.264 0.262 0.214 0.174
Double Cluster S.E. (0.090) (0.088) (0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.064)
Conley S.E. [0.098] [0.077] [0.065] [0.066] [0.060] [0.049]
R2 0.071 0.248 0.473 0.502 0.579 0.648
N 336 336 336 336 336 336
Country FE N Y N Y Y Y
Intendency FE N N Y Y Y Y
Location Controls N N N N Y Y
Geographic Controls N N N N N Y
PopDens1492 N N N N N Y
Notes. The Table reports OLS estimates relating regional development with pre-colonial jurisdictional hierarchy
beyond the local community index as derived from Murdock 1951 and Murdock 1967. The unit of observation
ethnic-country-intendency. The dependent variable is log(0.01+light per capita) at the ethnicity-country-intendency
level. In columns 5-6 we control for location and geographic controls. The set of location controls include: log (1
+ area under water), log (surface area), distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country-intendency area from the
respective capital city, the distance from the sea coast, distance from the major river, the distance from the national
border. The set of geographic controls include: land suitability for agriculture, elevation, ruggedness, a malaria
stability index, temperature, precipitation a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. In column 6 we
control for log (pre-colonial population density).
The Data Appendix contains detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in
parentheses clustered standard errors at the country dimension. We report in brackets Conley?s (1999) standard
errors that account for 2-dimensional spatial auto-correlation.
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Table 2: The Long-Run Effects of Pre-colonial Political Complexity Conditioning on Other Pre-colonial
Ethnic Features
Dependent: Dependent: Light per capita in 2008-2012 (log)
Specification A Specification B
Variable Obs. Variable Jurisd Hierarchy Obs.
Gathering -0.242 311 0.102 0.458*** 311
(0.23) (0.24) (0.10)
Hunting 0.0847 310 0.558 0.470*** 310
(0.49) (0.56) (0.08)
Fishing -0.769 310 -0.186 0.422*** 310
(0.62) (0.53) (0.12)
Animal Husbandry 0.330* 312 0.0475 0.431*** 312
(0.16) (0.14) (0.11)
Agricultural Dependence 0.114* 312 0.0471 0.418*** 312
(0.05) (0.04) (0.10)
Polygyny -0.161 308 0.0650 0.444*** 308
(0.31) (0.31) (0.10)
Clan Communities (dummy) -2.079*** 266 -2.035*** 0.310* 266
(0.23) (0.22) (0.13)
Agricultural Type 0.440*** 292 0.276** 0.315** 292
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Settlements 0.0700 292 0.0167 0.424*** 292
0.06 0.06 (0.11)
Complex Settlement 0.162 291 -0.100 0.437*** 291
(0.32) 0.30 (0.11)
Local Community 0.140 292 0.0569 0.431*** 292
0.25 0.26 0.12
Local Community (dummy) 0.222 290 0.134 0.418*** 290
(0.24) (0.26) (0.12)
Milking -0.0939 292 -0.568 0.469*** 292
(0.76) (0.76) 0.12
Slavery 1.005*** 263 0.757** 0.474*** 263
(0.24) (0.24) (0.14)
Election (dummy) -0.832 177 -0.386 0.765** 177
(0.51) (0.59) (0.24)
Notes. The Table shows the within-country within-intendency OLS estimates linking regional development with precolonial
ethnic characteristics in Murdock 1967 Ethnographic Atlas. The dependent variable is the log (0.01 + light per capita) at the ethnic-
intendency-country level. All specification include a set of country fixed effect(constants not reported) and a set of intendency
fixed effect (constants not reported). In all specification A (in columns (1)-(2)) We regress the log(0.01 + light per capita) on
various ethnic traits from Murdock 1967. In specification B (in columns (3)-(5)) We regress the log(0.01 + light per capita) on
each Murdock’s additional variables and the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community index as derived from Murdock
(1951). The Data Appendix contains detailed variable description and construction. Below the estimates we report in parenthesis
Conley’s corrected standard errors.
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Table 3: Pre-Colonial Centralization and Sub-National Colonial Institutions
Number of Cajas Reales
Spanish America Sample
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.174** 0.174** 0.142***
Double Cluster S.E. 0.050 0.056 0.070 0.069 0.045
Conley S.E. 0.047 0.047 0.053 0.053 0.040
R2 0.173 0.248 0.331 0.368 0.528
N 328 328 328 328 328
Spanish America Sample w/ PopDens1492
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.171*** 0.160*** 0.163** 0.159** 0.133***
Double Cluster S.E. 0.044 0.053 0.067 0.063 0.042
Conley S.E. 0.047 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.041
PopDens1492 0.013 0.043* 0.041 0.064 0.054
Double Cluster S.E. 0.020 0.024 0.054 0.062 0.075
Conley S.E. 0.024 0.028 0.042 0.045 0.047
R2 0.174 0.255 0.334 0.375 0.531
N 328 328 328 328 328
Country FE N Y N Y Y
Intendency FE N N Y Y Y
PopDens1492 N N N Y Y
Location Controls N N N N Y
Geographic Controls N N N N Y
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Channel: Effect of Caja Real on Contemporary Development
Light Density in 2012 (Log)
Number of Cajas 0.502*** 0.608*** 0.647*** 0.698*** 0.507***
Double Cluster S.E. 0.117 0.120 0.151 0.160 0.161
Conley S.E. 0.110 0.088 0.116 0.110 0.092
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.257* 0.278** 0.235** 0.225* 0.174*
Double Cluster S.E. 0.144 0.138 0.113 0.127 0.094
Conley S.E. 0.130 0.114 0.100 0.106 0.063
R2 0.129 0.296 0.502 0.531 0.555
N 328 328 328 328 328
Country FE N Y N Y Y
Intendency FE N N Y Y Y
Location Controls N N N N Y
Geographic Controls N N N N Y
17
7 Appendix A
Population Density in 2000 (log)
Latin America Full Sample
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.723*** 0.664*** 0.506*** 0.494*** 0.324*** 0.270**
Double Cluster S.E. (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Conley S.E. (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
R2 0.139 0.299 0.599 0.619 0.659 0.758
N 478 478 478 478 478 478
Spanish America Sample
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.670*** 0.643*** 0.518*** 0.520*** 0.333*** 0.284**
Double Cluster S.E. (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Conley S.E. (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
R2 0.156 0.352 0.570 0.599 0.658 0.764
N 328 328 328 328 328 328
Country FE N Y N Y Y Y
Intendency FE N N Y Y Y Y
PopDens1492 N N N N Y Y
Location Controls N N N N N Y
Geographic Controls N N N N N Y
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7.1 Data Construction and Sources
Variables at the ethnicity-country-intendency / Pixel level
Night Lights
Average population in 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of population across raster
grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, with data from the Center for Interna-
tional Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia University, United Nations Food and Agriculture Pro-
gramme - FAO, and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical - CIAT. 2005. Gridded Population of the World, Ver-
sion 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC).
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/gpw-v3-population-count.
Ln Population Density
Natural logarithm of the average night lights intesity. Source: NOOA National Geophysical Data Centre for the year 2000.
Malaria Ecology
Average Malaria Ecology Index. Source: Malaria Ecology index from Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and
Sachs 2004.
Average Temperature
Mean annual temperature (baseline period 1961-1990). Source: FAO/IIASA, 2011-2012. Global Agro-ecological Zones
(GAEZ v3.0). FAO Rome, Italy and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Average Precipitation
Average monthly precipitation mm/month (baseline period 1961-1990). Source: CRU CL 2.0 data from New, Lister, Hulme,
and Makin 2002.
Land Suitability
Average land suitability. Source: land suitability index from Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and McSweeney 2002.
Mean Elevation
Average elevation. Source: mean elevation is constructed with data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.
Ruggedness
Average ruggedness (Terrain Ruggedness Index, 100 m). Source: mean ruggedness is constructed with data
from Terrain Ruggedness Index originally devised by Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999), obtained through http :
//diegopuga.org/data/rugged/#grid.
Total Water Area
Total area occupied by water within the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting the 1x1 degree cell
grid and the Digital Chart of the World inwater shapefile, by intersecting the 1x1 degree cell grid and the Digital Chart of the
World oceans and sea shapefile. We sum up total in-cell water area and the areas of the cell occupied by seas and oceans, areas
computed with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection.
Total Area
Total area of the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting the 1x1 degree cell grid and the World
Language Mapping System shapefile from the Digital Chart of the World. We exclude cell parts not covered by World Language
Mapping System data (and by the Africa Murdock Map, and the Murdock map for North and South America), areas computed
with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection.
Ln Distance Coast
Distance to closest coast. Source: constructed with ArcGIS the digital Chart of the World coastline shapefile.
Ln Distance Border
Distance to closest border. Source: constructed with ArcGIS the digital Chart of the World boundaries shapefile.
Ln Distance Capital
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Distance to the capital of the country where lies the centroid of the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS the digital
World Capital shapefile.
Ln Distance River
Distance to closest river. Source: constructed with ArcGIS using MajorRiversW orld from www.naturalearth.com
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Table 5: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Abipon No Level The tribe is organized into politically autonomous migratory bands
Aburra Missing No information
Acaxee
Achagua No Level there is no political integration above the level of the local headman or clan chief
Acroa Missing No information
Aguano Missing No information
Alacaluf Missing No information
Amahuaca No Level Communities are politically autonomous
Amayane Missing No information
Apalai Missing No information
Apiaca No Level Villages are politically indipendent
Apinaye No Level Each village is politically autonomous
Arara Missing No information
Araucanians Two Level Communities, each with a headman, are politically organized into districts under paramount chiefs
Arawak Missing No information
Arawine Missing No information (like Yaruma)
Arikem Missing No information
Arua Missing No information
Ashluslay Missing No information
Atacama No Level They are clustered in villages under presumably autonomous headmen
Atsahuaca Missing No information
Auake Missing No information
Aueto No Level A headman with limited authority presides over an entire village, which is politically independent of others.
Aweikoma No Level Autonomous migratory bands
Aymara Three Level Nation was divided into a number of states
Aztec
Bacairi No Level No political integration beyond local level
Baniwa Missing No information
Barauna Missing No information
Barbacoa Missing No information
Betoi No Level villages are small, politically independent villages
Bororo One Level Paramount chief in at least one district (not in all)
Botucudo No Level Autonomous migratory bands
Cagaba Missing No information
Cahita
Cahuapana Missing No information
Caingang No Level Local groups are politically autonomous
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Table 6: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Camacan Missing No information
Camaracoto Missing No information
Campa No Level Villages are politically autonomous
Canari One Level Local headmen are subject to the rulers of petty states with a complex officialdom
Canelo Missing No information
Canichana Missing No information
Caquetio One Level The communities of district are politically organized as petty state under a paramount chiefs
Caraca Two Level Villages are politically organized into districts under paramount chiefs
Caraja No Level Villages are politically autonomous
Carib No Level Each community is politically autonomous under a headman
Carijona Missing No information
Cariri No Level Villages are politically autonomous
Cashinawa One Level Socially aggregated villages
Catio Two Level Political authority is exercized by local headmen and paramount chiefs of districts
Catukina Missing No information
Cawahib One Level Paramount chiefs are present in some region (not all)
Cayamo No Level like Coroa
Cayapa Missing No information
Cayapo Missing No information
Cayuvava Missing No information
Cazcan
Cenu One Level Large villages ruled by local chiefs and sub-chiefs, who commonly pay tribute to more powerful chiefs district
Chake Missing No information
Chama No Level Each settlement is politically autonomous
Chandule Missing No information
Chane Two Level like Chiriguano
Chapacura Missing No information
Charrua No Level Politically autonomous migratory bands
Chibcha Three Level Chibcha are organized into five warring feudal states, each with a king who exctracts tribute from conquered vassals
Chinantec
Chinato No Level lack political integration beyond local headmen with limited authority
Chinipa
Chipanec
Chiquito No Level Community is governed by an headman of great prestige assisted by lesser chiefs and is usually political autonomous
Chiricaua
Chiriguano One Level Communities are often aggregated under paramount chiefs (not always)
Choco No Level Communities are politically automnomous
Chono Missing No information
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Table 7: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Chorotega
Choroti No Level There are nominal chiefs over larger groups, but they do not have real authority
Coahuilteco
Cocama No Level People live in large politically autonomous villages
Cochimi
Cofan Missing No information
Colorado Missing No information
Comechingon No Level Villages are politically autonomous
Concho
Copopa
Cora
Coroa No Level The village is governed by two headman and a council, and is politically autonomous
Cumana Two Level In addition to local headmen, there are paramount chiefs over small states
Cuna Two Level Endogamous villages, each under an elective headman, are organized into districts ruled by paramount chiefs
Diaguita No Level Politically autonomous head man
Diegueno
Emerillon Missing No information
Encabellado No Level The people live in politically autonomous villages
Esmeralda No Level They live in politically autonomous villages
Fulnio Missing No information
Gauyupe No Level People live in politically autonomous villages
Gayon Missing No information
Goajira No Level politically autonomous migratory bands
Guachi Missing No information
Guachichil
Guahibo Missing No information
Guaitaca Missing No information
Guaja Missing No information
Guamo Missing No information
Guamontey Missing No information
Guana No Level Each village is politically autonomous
Guarani No Level Politically autonomous communities
Guarayu Missing No information
Guasave
Guato Missing No information
Guayaki No Level Autonomous migratory bands
Guaymi
Gueren No Level like Botucudo
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Table 8: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Huarpe Missing No information
Huave
Huaxtec
Huichol
Inca Four Level Political integration is the most complex in native America
Ipurina No Level Communities are politically autonomous
Itonama Missing No information
Janambre
Jeico Missing No information
Jicaque
Jirajara Two Level Paramount chiefs rule over districts or even, at least nominally, over entire tribes
Jivaro No Level community with an indipendent family head
Jumano
Kamia
Kitemoca No Level like Chiquito
Lagunero
Lama Missing No information
Leco Missing No information
Lenca
Lipan
Maca Missing No information
Macu Missing No information
Macurap Missing No information
Macusi No Level Each settlement has a headman
Manao One Level The authority of chiefs apparently extends in some instances beyond the local communities
Manta Two Level Paramount chiefs rule over a number of [..] settlements
Masco Missing No information
Mascoi No Level Local groups are politically autonomous
Mashacali Missing No information
Mataco No Level Each band is politically autonomous under a local headman
Maue Missing No information
Mayoruna Missing No information
Mbaya Two Level Politically aggregated under a paramount chief
Mixtec
Mocovi No Level No information
Mojo Missing No information
Mosetene No Level Politically autonomous settlements
Mosquito
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Table 9: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Motilon Missing No information
Movima Missing No information
Mundurucu Missing No information
Mura Missing No information
Nambicuara No Level Each village is politically autonomous
Nevome
Omagua Missing No information
Omaguaca Two Level They (villages) are aggregated under paramount chiefs
Ona No Level true chiefship is absent
Opata
Opaye Missing No information
Otomac No Level Extreme local autonomy prevails
Otomi
Otuke No Level like Chiquito
Pacaguara Missing No information
Paez Two Level Paramount chiefs rule over districts composed of a number of such dispersed communities, each with its local headman
Palikur Missing No information
Pame
Pantangoro No Level Political integration does not extend beyond the local community
Papago
Paressi One Level Instances of Paramount chief (not always)
Pasto No Level Dwellings aggregated into compact villages, each politically autonomous under a local headman
Patagon Missing No information
Patasho Missing No information
Paumary No Level Settlements are politically autonomous
Paya
Payagua Missing No information
Pilaga Missing No information
Pima
Piro No Level Politically independent settlements
Puelche Missing No information
Puinave Missing No information
Puri No Level Autonomous migratory bands
Quimbaya Two Level Villages are organized into districts under paramount chiefs
Quito One Level Paramount chiefs rule over a number of such settlements (not all)
Rama
Rukuyen No Level Each community is politically autonomous under a headman
Saliva Missing No information
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Table 10: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Saraveca No Level like Chiquito
Seri
Shacriaba One Level like Sherente
Sherente One Level Neighborhood villages are loosely organized under a council composed of the local headman but without any single paramount chief
Shiriana No Level Local headmen exercise considerable authority
Siriono Missing No information
Suya No Level Each village is politically autonomous
Tacana No Level Each [community] is ruled by an headman
Tahue
Talamanca
Tamanac Missing No information
Tamaulipeco
Tapiete Missing No information
Tarahumara
Tarairu Two Level Villages are apparently politically integrated under a paramount chiefs
Tarasco
Taripare Missing No information
Taulipang No Level Villages are political autonomous
Tehuelche Missing No information
Tempqui Missing No information
Tenetehara No Level Villages are politically autonomous
Tepehuan
Tequistlateco
Terembe Missing No information
Timba Two Level Paramount chiefs rule over a number of villages
Timbira No Level Each village enjoy political autonomy
Timbu Missing No information
Timote Two Level Villages are politically organized into districts under paramount chiefs
Toba No Level Politically autonomous migratory bands
Tonocote Missing No information
Totonac
Totorame
Trumai No Level Villages are political autonomous
Tucano No Level People live in politically autonomous settlements
Tucuna No Level Each community is politically independent
Tunebo Three Level similar to Chibcha
Tupi One Level apparently share culture of Tupinamba
Tupinamba One Level One chief often (not always) exercises paramount authority over a number of villages
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Table 11: Recoding of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community Level
Ethnic Homeland Jurisdictional Hierarchy Narrative
Uru Missing No information
Vilela Missing No information
Waicuri
Waiwai Missing No information
Wapishana No Level Each community is politically autonomous under a headman
Waraicu Missing No information
Warrau No Level Each village has a headman
Waura No Level Villages are political autonomous
Witoto Missing No information
Yabuti Missing No information
Yagua No Level People live in politically autonomous settlements
Yahgan Missing No information
Yamamdi No Level Each village has a headman and is politically autonomous
Yaruma Missing No information
Yaruro Missing No information
Yecuana No Level Politically autonomous under a headman
Yuma Missing No information
Yuma
Yunca Three Level [..] Large towns. Yunca were organized in a poweful feudal state
Yuracare No Level politically autonomous settlements
Yurimagua Missing No information
Yuruna No Level Each community is politically independent
Zacalteco
Zamuco One Level Chamoco (at least one tribe not all) keeps slaves and are politically organized under paramount chiefs who rule over several bands
Zaparo Missing No information
Zapotec
Zoque
Notes. The Table shows the coding procedure for the Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local Community Level for Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Narratives are extracted from Murdock (1951). The coding is taken from
the codebook from Gray(1999).
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Table 12: Caja Reales
Caja Real Virreinato Latitude Longitude Source
Acapulco Nueva Espana 16,85000038 -99,8666687
Antioquia Nueva Granada 6,559721947 -75,82805634
Arequipa Peru -16,39882278 -71,53688049
Arica Upper Peru -18,48333359 -70,33333588
Arispe Nueva Espana 30,33083344 -110,1691666
Bolanos Nueva Espana 21,83055687 -103,7805557
Buenos Aires Rio de la Plata -34,60833359 -58,37194443
Cailloma Peru -15,63669395 -71,60227203
Campeche Nueva Espana 18,83638954 -90,40333557
Carabaya Peru -14,06950092 -70,4312439
Caracas Nueva Granada 10,5 -66,91666412
Caragnas Upper Peru -18,45000076 -67,44999695
Cartagena Nueva Granada 10,39999962 -75,5
Cartago Nueva Granada 4,814278126 -75,69455719
Castrovirreyna Peru -12,78583336 -74,97277832
Catamarca Rio de la Plata -28,46666718 -65,78333282
Chachapoyas Peru -6,216667175 -77,84999847
Charcas Upper Peru -19,04999924 -65,25
Chiloe Chile -42,60610962 -73,80502319
Chiuahua Nueva Espana 28,6352787 -106,0888901
Chucuito Chile -16,21439552 -69,4573822
Citara Nueva Granada 5,692276955 -76,6581955
Cochabamba Upper Peru -17,39361191 -66,15694427
Concepcion Peru -11,91847801 -75,3128891
Cordoba de Tucuman Rio de la Plata -31,41666794 -64,18333435
Coro 11,4 -69,683333
Corrientes Rio de la Plata -27,46666718 -58,81666565
Cuenca(Loja) Ecuador -2,883300066 -78,98329926
Cumana Nueva Granada 10,44999981 -64,16666412
Cuzco Peru -13,52614117 -71,97130585
Durango Nueva Espana 24,01666641 -104,6666641
Giron Nueva Granada 7,070833206 -73,17305756
Guadalajara Nueva Espana 20,66666794 -103,3499985
Guanajuato Nueva Espana 21,0177784 -101,2566681
Guayana Nueva Granada 8,373100281 -62,64360046
Guayaquil Ecuador -2,18333292 -79,8833313
Hacha Nueva Granada 11,54416656 -72,90694427
Honda Nueva Granada 5,204166889 -74,7416687
Huancavelica Peru -12,78583336 -74,97277832
Humanga Peru -13,17000008 -74,22000122
Jaen de Bracamoras Ecuador -5,699999809 -78,80000305
Jauja Peru -11,77499962 -75,5
Jujui Rio de la Plata -24,20000076 -65,30000305
La Guaira 10,6 -66,933056
Notes. The Table shows the coding procedure for the Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local Community Level
for Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Narratives are extracted from Murdock (1951). The coding is
taken from the codebook from Gray(1999).
29
Caja Real Virreinato Latitude Longitude Source
La Paz Upper Peru -16,50222206 -68,16555786
La Rioja Rio de la Plata -29,43333244 -66,84999847
Lima Peru -12,03499985 -77,01860809
Maldonado Rio de la Plata -34,90000153 -54,95000076
Mantucana Peru -11,84472179 -76,3861084
Maracaibo Nueva Granada 10,64999962 -71,6166687
Mendoza Chile -32,8833313 -68,81666565
Merida Nueva Espana 20,96999931 -89,62000275
Mexico Nueva Espana 19,43333244 -99,1333313
Michoacan Nueva Espana 19,16861153 -101,8997192
Mompox Nueva Granada 9,241944313 -74,42666626
Montevideo Rio de la Plata -34,88360977 -56,1819458
Neiva Nueva Granada 2,92750001 -75,28749847
Novita Nueva Granada 4,956110954 -76,60610962
Oaxaca Nueva Espana 17,08333206 -96,75
Ocana Nueva Granada 8,233332634 -73,34999847
Oruro Upper Peru -17,96666718 -67,1166687
Pachuca Nueva Espana 20,12166786 -98,73583221
Pamplona Nueva Granada 7,378056049 -72,65249634
Panama Nueva Granada 8,966667175 -79,53333282
Paraguay Rio de la Plata -25,29638863 -57,64138794
Piura y Paita Peru -5,092735767 -81,10197449
Popayan Nueva Granada 2,444166899 -75,6213913
Portobelo Nueva Granada 9,553889275 -79,65583038
Potosi Upper Peru -19,58333206 -65,75
Presidio del Carmen Nueva Espana 20,62750053 -87,08110809
Puebla de los Angeles Nueva Espana 19,04527855 -98,19750214
Puerto Cabello 10,466667 -68,016667
Puno Peru -15,84333324 -70,02361298
Quito Ecuador -0,216700003 -78,5
Remedios Nueva Granada 7,030832767 -74,53333282
Rosario Nueva Espana 30,06027794 -115,726944
Salta Rio de la Plata -24,78333282 -65,41666412
Saltillo Nueva Espana 25,43333244 -101
San Juan Rio de la Plata -31,53722191 -68,52527618
San Luis de Potosi Nueva Espana 22,14972115 -100,9749985
Sana Peru -7,085278034 -79,71611023
Santa Cruz de la Sierra Upper Peru -17,79999924 -63,16666794
Santa Fe Nueva Granada 4,611700058 -74,0759964
Santa Fe de Veracruz Rio de la Plata -31,63333321 -60,70000076
Santa Marta Nueva Granada 11,24722195 -74,20166779
Santiago de Chile Chile -33,43783188 -70,65032959
Santiago del Estero Rio de la Plata -27,79999924 -64,26667023
Notes. The Table shows the coding procedure for the Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local Community Level for
Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Narratives are extracted from Murdock (1951). The coding is taken
from the codebook from Gray(1999).
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Caja Real Virreinato Latitude Longitude Source
Sombrerete Nueva Espana 23,63299942 -103,6500015
Tabasco Nueva Espana 17,97222137 -92,58889008
Trujillo Peru -8,016667366 -79
Tucuman Rio de la Plata -26,83333206 -65,19999695
Valdivia Chile -39,80833435 -73,2416687
Veracruz Nueva Espana 19,1902771 -96,15333557
Vico y Pasco Peru -10,68360043 -76,26519775
Zacatecas Nueva Espana 22,77166748 -102,5752792
Zimapan Nueva Espana 20,73333359 -99,3833313
Notes. The Table shows the coding procedure for the Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local Com-
munity Level for Central and South America (excluding Mexico). Narratives are extracted from Murdock
(1951). The coding is taken from the codebook from Gray(1999).
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Abstract
In this paper we argue that malaria exposure represented a fundamental deter-
minant of modern ethno-linguistic diversity. We conjecture that in highly malarial
areas the necessity to adapt and develop immunities specific to the local disease
environment historically reduced mobility and increased isolation, thus leading to
the formation of a higher number of different ethno-linguistic groups. We con-
duct the first part of the analysis at a disaggregated level by creating a grid of
artificial countries of 1x1 degree of size (around 110 square km at the equator) to
employ as units of observation. We use a rich set of new data on ethno-linguistic
diversity constructed from geolocalized maps of ethno-linguistic groups around the
world at several points in history, as well as new data on historical malaria en-
demicity. Results point to a strong positive correlation between historical malaria
endemicity and the number of ethno-linguistic groups at all levels of spatial disag-
gregation. In the second part of the exercise, we explore the micro-channels behind
the above empirical regularity. We hypothesize that the increased isolation caused
by malaria and the need to exploit and preserve location-specific immunities (i)
strengthened ethnic identity and (ii) increased the propensity to marry within the
group. Therefore, we employ georeferenced indivual data from the third wave of
the Afrobarometer survey and show that malaria exposure is positively correlated
with the strenght of ethnic identity. Moreover, we exploit modern data on mar-
riage patterns in 22 African countries retrieved from the Demographic and Health
Survey. Regressions’ results show that endogamous marriages are more frequent in
areas with higher geographic suitability to malaria.
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1 Introduction
A vast and consolidated stream of economic literature has been documenting the economic con-
sequences of ethno-linguistic diversity [among many others] (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina
and Ferrara, 1999, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). More recent contributions, and in particular
Michalopoulos (2008) and Ashraf and Galor (2013), make the point that ethno-linguistic diver-
sity is in itself a consequence of more fundamental features of the geographical environment,
showing that geo-physical characteristics, such as the heterogeneity in land suitability and the
migratory distance from the cradle of humankind in East Africa, are associated with higher
contemporary ethnic diversity today.
In this paper we document that an additional important geographical feature - geographic
suitability to malaria - explains part of the currently observed ethno-linguistic diversity across
and within modern countries. We hypothesize that in highly malarial areas the necessity to
adapt and preserve immunities specific to the local disease environment increased isolation,
reduced mobility and population admixture with neighboring groups, with the consequence of
producing and preserving a larger number of different ethno-linguistic groups. From one hand,
as we know from historical narratives, the danger associated with moving into diseased envi-
ronments has been historically an obstacle to trade and commerce. Ramen (2002) mentions
the practice of “silent trade” - i.e. trade at a distance between caravans from North Africa and
population at the south of the Sahara - devised to prevent the traders from exchanging danger-
ous germs on top of the goods. It is well known that malaria represented one of the most lethal
diseases in history and, for this reason, it likely constituted a major obstacle to trade and, more
generally, to population movements. As a matter or fact, the Boer trekkers faced high morbid-
ity and mortality while adventuring into northern tropical areas, having in the end to resettle
in more temperate regions (Becker, 1985). Malaria represented a barrier between places where
malaria was endemic and places where it was absent, but also between highly malarial areas and
equally malarial neighboring areas. Diamond and Ford (2000) argued that “tropical Africans
were combating malaria with more than just antibodies... by living in relatively small commu-
nities, spread out over vast areas...[to] limit the level of malaria transmission”. On top of this, it
is important to mention that malaria exists in various strains and that a whole set of location-
specific strains were discovered, against which only strain-specific resistance can offer some form
of protection. Curtin (1968, 1998) showed that African troops had higher mortality rates in for-
eign African countries than in their home-countries, possibly a consequence of different strains
of malaria encountered in foreign African countries. Historian William McNeill (1976) argued
that in the Indian sub-continent the heterogeneity in epidemiological endowments between in-
trusive Aryans and local “forest folks” prevented the local primitive communities from being
“digested” into the invaders’ civilization, remaining semi-autonomous and separated. Malaria,
for instance, protected for centuries the isolation of Tharu people of Nepal (Brower and John-
ston, 2007). After centuries of residence in malaria-infested regions, Tharu people developed
significant genetic resistance to malaria, to the point that they faced an about sevenfold lower
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malaria incidence than synpatric non-Tharu people (Modiano, Morpurgo, Terrenato, Novelletto,
Di Rienzo, Colombo, Purpura, Mariani, Santachiara-Benerecetti, Brega, et al., 1991). Malaria
immunities allowed Tharu people to live undisturbed from neighboring powerful civilization, as
they were the only group able to survive in those infested lands. Strict endogamy practiced
by the Tharu confined these traits to this indigenous group and preserved this location-specific
advantage.
In this work, we provide empirical evidence of the relationship linking malaria incidence
with the historical and contemporaneous number of ethno-linguistic groups observed across and
within countries. In order to do so we exploit the framework devised by Michalopoulos (2008)
and conduct the analysis at a disaggregated level, by superimposing over modern countries a
grid of artificial squares, measuring 1x1 degree of size. By doing so, we are able to concentrate
on within-country variation of malaria incidence and diversity, as cross-country variation in
diversity could hide key historical state-formation processes as unobservable confounders. One
particularly challenging obstacle faced by the literature exploring the consequences of disease
exposure lies in the search for exogenous measures of disease incidence, as it is well known
that disease prevalence is highly influenced by living standards (diets, housing condition, public
health, agricultural practices) and by patterns of population density and isolation. For these
reasons, our attempt is to exploit only the exogenous component of historical malaria inci-
dence, exploiting two reasonably exogenous disaggregated indexes. The first index we use is the
malaria stability index devised by Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs
(2004), which aims at measuring the force and stability of malaria transmission, based on the
biological characteristics of the regionally dominant vector mosquitoes, such as their propensity
to feed on humans and their daily survival, and how these features interact with the climatic
environment. The second index is a recently available historical measure of malaria endemicity
measured at the beginning of the twentieth century, produced by Lysenko (1968) and recently
digitalized by (Hay S.I., 2004). In our view, the index has to be preferred to modern measures
of clinical malaria incidence, insofar as it measures the degree of malaria endemicity in a time
where the main massive malaria eradication campaigns had still to be conceived and realized.
We depart from previous work exploring the relationship between disease and diversity along
several dimensions1. First, we concentrate on the role played by malaria alone, based on the
fact that malaria has likely been the most destructive disease in human history. Malaria is
known as the “strongest known selective pressure in the recent history of the human genome”
Kwiatkowski (2005), and just as much as it affected the evolution of the human genome, we
argue it molded the social structure and habits of societies residing in the affected areas. We
do not exclude that malaria acted in combination with other relevant human diseases, however,
1A previous empirical work by (Cashdan, 2001) highlighted a correlation between ethnic diversity and
pathogens load, she concentrated on six diseases: leishmanias (three species), trypanosomes (two species),
malaria (four species), schistosomes (three species), filariae (two species), spirochetes (two species and
one genus), and leprosy. Birchenall (2010) exploits the same of set of diseases and a similar framework
to investigate the long term effect of diseases on development
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we maintain that malaria was the major driving force, even if its effects may have been wors-
ened by the interaction with other harmful co-existing diseases. Secondly, we highlight that
the relation between malaria incidence and diversity exists at different points in history, today
and before colonization. Exploiting the fact that malaria was not present in the New World
before colonization, we show that the relationship between geographic suitability to malaria and
ethno-linguistic diversity is absent in pre-colonial Americas. This exercise, which we perform
as a sort of “placebo test”, mitigates the concern that our index of geographic suitability to
malaria is capturing the effect on diversity of climatic and geographic characteristics spuriously
related with malaria suitability. In order to test this, we exploit Murdock (1959) data on the
distribution of ethnic groups in pre-colonial North and South America, recently digitized by
Chiovelli (2014).
Our main contribution to the literature exploring the fundamental determinants of ethno-
linguistic diversity is to propose and explicitly test two of the possible channels that link malaria
and ethno-linguistic diversity. Firstly, we investigate the link between malaria exposure and the
saliency of ethnic identity. Using data from the third wave of the Afrobarometer, a large-scale
survey assessing prevalent cultural and political individual attitudes, from 16 countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Respondents are asked to declare how strongly they identify with their national
country versus their ethnic group. Our results show that in places more suitable for malaria
respondents tend to identify more with their ethnic group rather than with their nationality,
the relation holds when controlling for a large set of geographical and individual controls. In
the second part of the exercise, we hypothesize that in highly malarial environment the need to
exploit and preserve location-specific immunities reduced the practice of marrying away from
home and from former kinship ties, thus increasing the propensity to arrange endogamous mar-
riages. We test this hypothesis using contemporary data on marriage patterns in Africa from
the Demographic and Health Survey. We exploit several waves of the survey conducted in 1815
clusters across 22 African countries, whenever information on both the ethic identity of the
wife and the husband was available. Since information on ethnicity varies along waves and
countries - as for some waves very detailed information on ethnic identity is provided whereas
for other waves more aggregated ethnic families are reported - we associate all reported ethnic
identities to the various branches of the Ethnologue tree. In this way, we are able to compute
the propensity to marry within the ethnic family at various level of ethnic family aggregation.
We show that, at intermediate levels of ethnic disaggregation, individuals living in areas with a
higher suitability to malaria have higher propensity to marry somebody from their same group.
Results hold when controlling for individual level of education, age and whether the individual
is a urban or rural dweller.
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2 Malaria Exposure and Ethno-Linguistic Diversity
Our first attempt is to document the existence of a macro correlation strong and sizable in
magnitude between ethnic diversity and malaria exposure.
2.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
Empirical Strategy We follow the framework devised by Michalopoulos (2008) and create
a grid of cells of 1x1 degree of size, corresponding to about 110 km at the equator. By doing so,
we create a set of squared “artificial countries” which we exploit as unit of observation. This
approach has two main advantages: from one hand, the small size of cells allow us to measure
more accurately geographical and environmental features, variables such as elevation, average
precipitation and temperature are more accurately measured this way than in the aggregated
form of a standard cross-country regressions; ii) from another hand, by looking at small artificial
cells we can address an additional source of variability, i.e. within country variability. In fact,
following this framework, we can easily account for common country effects and get rid the
potential confounding factors which act at the country level, such as institutional or cultural
features. This approach has also a set of shortcomings, the most compelling one being that
many variables for which we would like to control for, such as GDP or average human capital,
are not available at such a finer spatial resolution. However, it is also true that all these controls
would be endogenous to our variable of interests and could not be included into the regression
without fears of biased estimates.
We estimate the relationship between the natural logarithm of the number of linguistic
groups in the 1x1 degree cell and the incidence of malaria. Our baseline specification follows:
Ln(NumberofGroups)i,c = β0 + β1Malariai,c + β2Xi,c + µc + i,c
where i indicates the cell, and c the country. Xi,c includes a vast set of climatic, geographical
and location controls, µc stands for country fixed effects. Based on our conceptual framework,
we hypothesize further that the effect of malaria on linguistic diversity could be higher in
places with a high heterogeneity in the stock of acquired and innate immunities. We expect
this heterogeneity to be higher in places with a higher variation in elevation since, because of
its reliance on mosquitoes for transmission, malaria cannot be transmitted in highlands even
whenever present in the neighboring lowlands. Because of this precise reason, we might find
neighboring areas where people living in the lowlands developed strong immunities to malaria
and people in the highland did not. This heterogeneity in immunity endowment could in
principle represent a barrier to the admixing of these groups. We test this prediction by looking
at the interaction between malaria incidence with a measure of the standard deviation of the
elevation in the cell Mali,c ∗ STDElevi,c:
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Ln(NofGroups)i,c = β0 +β1Mali,c+β2STDElevi,c+β3Mali,c ∗STDElevi,c+β2Xi,c +µc +i,c
The Data The World Language Mapping System database offers, to our knowledge, the
most comprehensive mapping of the world’s known living languages2. We compute the number
of languages spoken in all cells of our dataset, excluding languages spoken by less than 10000
people overall. Figure 1 shows how the number of languages per cell varies across the world.
Note that in about half of the cells composing our sample only one language is spoken, while
in one fourth of the cell 3 or more languages are currently in use.
In order to measure malaria exposure, we rely on the work of Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman,
Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004), which constructed their index as follows: they associated to
each country a dominant vector of Anopheles mosquitoes (for countries with different dominant
mosquitoes, mosquitoes were association to sub-regions). A monthly index of stability was then
computed as a parametric function of the share of blood meal taken by the mosquito, the daily
survival rate and the extrinsic incubation period. Once this regional monthly index (constructed
for about 260 regions in the world) was created, in order to obtain a finer data resolution, a
mimimum lagged threshold of precipitation (10 mm) was exploited as a pre-condition for malaria
transmission. The yearly aggregation of such an index is the malaria stability index which we
exploit in our analysis.
The second measure of malaria incidence that we use is a historical one. It was produced
by Lysenko (1968) and recently digitized by (Hay S.I., 2004), it aims at measuring the level of
malaria endemicity at the beginning of the 20th century. Endemicity is defined as the parasite
rate (PR) in the 2-10 year age cohort 3. The index takes value 0 wherever malaria is absent, 1 for
epidemic areas, 2 where malaria is hypoendemic, 3 for mesoendemic areas, 4 for hyperendemic
and 5 for holoendemic areas. As previously mentioned, the level of malaria endemicity could
be endogenous to several factors such as agricultural activity and population density, however,
insofar as it is measured at the begininning of the 20th it precedes the timing of the massive
malaria eradication campaings which took place after the IIWW. It is reasonable to consider
than before the era of massive eradication campaing, the incidence of malaria was more tightly
related to climatic factors than it is today.
As a robustness, we exploit what we consider three additional proxies of historical malaria
incidence: three blood related genetic variants which have been shown to be strictly associated
with historical malaria incidence. HbS stands for sickle haemoglobin allele frequency in 2010,
G6PD for allele frequency for G6PD deficiency in 2010, and Duffy for Duffy negative phenotype
again measured in 2010.
2Note that we exploit a definition of ethnicity based on language, this choice follows both theoretical
and empirical consideration.
3Hypoendemic with PR lower than 0.1; mesoendemic with PR between 0.11-0.5; hyperendemic for
0.51-0.75 for the holoendemic class (PR higher than 0.75), the PR refers to the 1-year age group
6
2.2 Results
Table 1 reports baseline results. An increase in malaria incidence is associated with a sizable and
robust increase in the number of languages spoken in a cell, see Column 1-5 in Table 1. In terms
of magnitude, going from a cell with no malaria to a cell which was historically holoendemic
increases the average number of language spoken in the cell by almost one fourth. We obtain a
similar estimate when we look at the results of the regression with the malaria ecology index of
stability in transmission, in this case going from a place with 0 malaria stability to a place with
an average stability of 34, increases the number of groups by 0.23%, see Column 6-10 in Table
1. Results are confirmed when looking at the effect of genetic immunities, Table 2 and when
looking at the number of pre-colonial ethnic group as reported by Murdock (1959), see Table 4.
Consistent with our predictions, the correlation between the indexes of malaria and the number
of ethno-linguistc groups is not present when looking at the distribution of ethnic groups of
pre-colonial Americas, since the disease was not present in the New World before colonization.
Finally, there is an extra effect of malaria incidence on ethnic diversity in areas with a larger
than average heterogeneity in elevation (Table 3).
3 Looking for the Channel
In the previous section we documented that areas more suitable for malaria present higher lev-
els of ethno-linguistic diversity. In this section we explore two micro-channels linking malaria
exposure to contemporaneous levels of ethno-linguistic diversity.
3.1 Malaria Exposure and Ethnic Saliency
We first focus on the saliency of ethnic lines in defining individual identity. Ethnic traits are
crucial technlogy in aggregating preferences and beliefs. Our hypothesis is that the degree to
which an individual identify himself as belonging to a particular ethnic group should be positive
related to the exposure of malaria.
Data In order to test this hypothesis we employ data from the third wave of Afrobarometer.
Afrobarometer is an indivual-level survey covering 16 Sub-Saharan African in 2005. The surveys
are conducted on a random sample ranging from 1200 to 2400 individuals in each district in
each country. The survey records information on the ethnic identity of each respondent, georef-
erenced information on the location of the respondent, individual information and a vast set of
questions exploring cultural and political attitudes. Thanks to this setting, for each individual
in the survey we know the exact location in which the interview was performed. This allows
us to merge the GPS information in the Afrobarometer with all the geographic and ecological
variables employed in the previous analysis.
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In order to proxy for the strength and salience of ethnic identity, we focus on the question
Let us suppose that you had to choose betweeb being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a
[respondent’s identity group] and (respondent’s group). Which of these two do you feel most
strongly attached to? (q82). The variable takes value from one (begin only identified with your
ethnic group) to five (begin only identified with your country nationality).
(a) Across Africa (b) Within Ghana
Figure 1: Afrobarometer Cluters
Empirical Strategy Our unit of observation is the individual respondent in location z,
district d and country c. In order to test whether ethnic identity is more salient in place with
higher malaria exposure, we exploit within-country - across Afrobarometer clusters - variability
using the following specification:
EthnicSaliencyi,z,d,c = β0 + β1Malariaz,d,c + β2Xz,d,c + Zi,z,d,c + µc + z,d,c
where EthnicSaliencyi,z,d,c is an ordered variable taking value from one (ethnic identity
only) to five (country identity only). Malz,d,c is a measure of malaria suitability in respondent
location z in district d in country c. Xz,d,c is a vector of time invariant geographical controls
(elevation (level and standard deviation), suitability of agriculture, temperature, precipitation.
Zi,z,d,c is a vector of individual characteristics (urban resident, education, age), µc is a country
dummy.
Results Table 5 summarizes main results. The coefficient of malaria ecology is significantly
negative: going from a cluster with no malaria to a cluster with the maximum level of malaria
increases the propensity to identify with her own ethnic group by a bit less than 1 point.
Importantly, the coefficient estimate does not change when including a vast set of geographic
controls. Interestingly, the correlation holds when exploiting variation within ethnic group. In
other words, conditional on the ethnic group the respondent belong to, he/she identifies more
12
Table 5: Malaria and Ethnic Saliency
Dependent Variable Identifies with Country vs Ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Malaria Ecology -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Geographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location and Distances No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Humidity and TseTse Suitability No No Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No No Yes Yes
Share of own group in District No No No Yes Yes
Size of own group in District No No No Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
N 20137 19901 18329 18329 18329
R-Squared 0.113 0.112 0.123 0.145 0.147
The dependent variable measures the strength of national identity vs. ethnic identity, it goes from 1 (only ethnic identity) to 5
(only national identity). Malaria Ecology measures the force and transmission of malaria in the location of the Afrobarometer
respondent. The ”Geographic Controls” include mean elevation, average soil suitability, average terrain ruggedness, average
precipitation and average temperature. The “Location and Distances” controls includes the natural logarithm of the distance
to the country capital and to the coast. OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the Afrobarometer respondent. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-% level, respectively.
with the group (and less with the country) in clusters with more malaria.
3.2 Malaria Exposure and Endogamous Marriages
The fact the malaria exposure increases ethno-lingustic heterogeneity is consistent with the idea
of ethno-linguistic diversity being affected by human interactions. Along with fertility and mor-
tality rates, human behaviors - such as migration and ethnic mixing - may alter the distribution
of ethnic groups in a given area. In a partial equilibrium world, endogamous ethnic marriage
is a crucial factor for the persistence of a given ethnic group in a given location. Moreover,
historical narratives (McNeill, 1975; Browner and Johnston, 2007) and genetic studies (Kwa-
iatkowski, 2005) point out that heterogeneity in epidemiological endowments is conducive to
the development of location-specific immunities. These two facts coupled together imply that
ethnic groups historically exposed to malaria may have a comparative advantage in terms of
differential mortality with respect to groups that were not exposed to malaria, or to the same
indigenous strains. Our hypothesis is that ethnic endogamicity may be an optimal individual
behavioral response to malaria exposure. If marriage decisions are driven by the observed differ-
ential mortality among ethnic groups, marrying within the group could maximize the survival
probability of the couple and of their descendants. This response is optimal in the sense that it
reduces the risk of losing the ethnic-specific immunities of the couple.
Data In order to test this hypothesis we use contemporary georeferenced data on marriage
patterns in Africa provided by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). DHS surveys are
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constructed to provide detailed information on a sub-national representative sample of women
of age ranging from 15 to 49. We exploit several waves of the survey conducted in 1815 cluster
across 22 African countries, see Figure 2. In most of the waves, data on married couples are
provided. In this exercise we use those waves for which information on both the ethnic identity
of the wife and the husband is available.
(a) Across Africa (b) Within Ghana
Figure 2: DHS Clusters
The exercise of identification of endogamous marriages is complicated by the fact that the
definition of ethnicity is not homogenous and varies along waves and countries. More precisely,
for the same country we might have a wave where it is specified the ethnicity x of individual Wi,
while in the following wave individual Wj is reported to belong to ethnicity x1, which actually
represents a sub-family of ethnicity x. In fact, in some cases the ethno-lingustic level reported
is a dialect, while in other cases we have only official national languages. This is problematic to
the extent to which the variability of ethno-linguistic diversity across waves and across country
is just artificially generated by the different levels of details and precision that characterized
the process of DHS data collection. To mitigate this issue, our strategy is to associate all eth-
nic groups reported in the DHS to the various branches of the Ethnologue trees (Gordon and
Grimes, 2005) (see 3). Following this procedure, we are able to assign each ethno-linguistic
entry in the DHS to the respective ethno-linguistc family in the Ethnologue. For every spouse
in the sample, we are therefore able to see whether he/she formed a couple with an individual
belonging to her ethnic group at various level of ethno-linguistic family aggregation.
From the DHS data, we extract individual - both for female and male - socio-economic (re-
ligion, urban residence, education) and democraphic (age) characteristics and the size of ethnic
group population in the region. Moreover, we exploit the spatial disaggregation of the DHS
data in order to construct our geographical controls. Notice that, in order to preserve respon-
dents confindenciality, DHS uses random displacement in the georeferencing process of different
clusters in each country. Urban clusters are displaced with a minimum of 0 and a maximum
of 2 kilometers of error. Rural clusters are instead displaced with an error of a minimum of 0
14
and a maximum of 5 kilometers of positional error with a further 1% of the rural clusters dis-
placed a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10 kilometers (DHS website) 4. In order to minimize
this displacement issue, we construct in ArcGIS a buffer of 10 km radius around the coordi-
nates of each cluster. In such a way, we are able to use the area inside this circle to construct
cluster-level measure of malaria suitability, elevation, suitability of agriculture, temperature and
precipitation. Since the area of the buffer contains the “true” location of each cluster, we think
this strategy represents a reasonable solution to the random displacement adopted in DHS data.
Empirical Strategy Our unit of observation is the individual respondent in cluster c in
country z for each avalaible wave t. In order to test whether there is a behavioral endogamous
respone to malaria exposure, we are going to exploit the within-country across cluster variability
using the following specification:
Endogamyi,c,z,t = β0 + β1Malc,z + β2Xc,z + Zi,c,z + µz + µt + i,c,z,t
where Endogamyi,c,z,t is a dummy variable taking value one if the indivual is married with
somebody belonging to the same ethnic group in cluster c in country z in wave t. Malc,z is
a measure of malaria suitability in cluster c in country z. Xc,z is a vector of time invariant
geographical controls (elevation (level and standard deviation), suitability of agriculture, tem-
perature, precipitation. Zi,c,z is a vector of individual characteristics (urban resident, education,
age). µz is a country dummy, µe is a female ethnic dummy, and µt is a wave dummy.
3.3 Results
Results are presented in different tables for levels of ethnolinguist familiy aggregation of Ethno-
logue Level 2 to 7. Results for each Ethnologue Level are reported in Table 6 to 7. Our baseline
specification is the one exploiting within-country across cluster variation in the relationship be-
tween endogamous marriages and malaria exposure. Results show a robust correlation between
endogamous marriages and malaria exposure when we look at at intermediate levels of ethnic
disaggregation. Within a country, individuals living in areas with a higher suitability to malaria
have higher propensity to marry somebody of the same group. The result holds when control-
ling for individual level of education, age and whether the individual is a urban or rural dwellers.
4Notice that there is no issue in the assignment of cluster near to country borders. In fact, ”dis-
placement is restricted so that the points stay within the country and within the DHS survey region
(DHS website). Morevoer, “In surveys released since 2009 the displacement is restricted to the country’s
second administrative level where possible.” (DHS website)
15
4 Conclusion
In this paper we hypothesize that malaria is a historical determinant of contemporary ethno-
linguistic diversity. In order to test this hypothesis, we show that higher historical malaria
incidence and higher geographic suitability to malaria are both associated to higher linguistic
diversity. We propose a channel linking malaria incidence and diversity, we conjecture that
malaria increased the propensity to marry within the groups. We test this hypothesis by looking
at marriage patterns within 22 African countries, we show that geographic suitability to malaria
is associated with a higher rate of endogamous marriages.
16
(a) Ethnologue, Level 1 (b) Ethnologue, Level 2
(c) Ethnologue, Level 3 (d) Ethnologue, Level 4
(e) Ethnologue, Level 5 (f) Ethnologue, Level 6
(g) Ethnologue, Level 7 (h) Ethnologue, Level 8
Figure 3: Ethnologue Language Groups, by Level of Disaggregation.
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5 Appendix
Table 8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Ln(Number of Language) 0.533 0.65 0 3.932 12762
Ln(Number of Language, Africa) 0.735 0.554 0 2.565 2662
Ln(Number of Language, Americas) 0.427 0.465 0 2.197 4637
Malaria Endemicity 1.31 1.477 0 5 15683
Malaria Ecology 1.809 4.943 0 34.728 16522
Average Temperature 8.081 15.203 -30.331 30.386 17263
Average Precipitation 60.697 59.003 0 640.889 17272
Mean Suitability 0.27 0.308 0 0.999 16498
Suitability 0.032 0.047 0 0.409 16498
Mean Elevation 624.722 792.77 -720.643 5725.512 17213
Variation Elevation 137.56 163.493 0 1868.89 17213
Ruggedness 85098.69 112044.254 30.148 1016771.313 17272
Total Water 0.513 0.877 0 9.146 17272
Total Area 8.072 3.31 1.001 12.308 12762
Number of Country 1.148 0.402 1 5 17272
Within Country 0.869 0.337 0 1 17272
Ln(Migratory Distance) 9.15 0.79 4.358 10.247 17263
Ln(Distance Coast) 11.746 2.055 0.357 14.546 17272
Ln(Distance Border) 11.035 1.83 -1.409 13.854 17272
Ln(Distance River) 12.653 1.456 3.875 15.878 17272
Ln(Distance Adis Ababa) 14.004 1.231 8.247 17.001 17170
Absolute Latitude 40.81 22.502 0.25 83.417 17272
Night Lights 3.604 3.169 0 49.196 16385
Ln(Population) 2.534 1.959 -2.197 9.037 10297
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Data Construction and Sources: Malaria and Diversity
Number of Languages, World Language Mapping System
Number of languages in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with a (ArcGIS) spatial join between a
1x1 degree grid and the World Language Mapping System language shapefile. We keep only languages
that are spoken by more than 1000 people overall. We exclude all intersections that measures less than
10 km squared.
Number of Ethnic Group, Murdock (1959)
Number of ethnic groups in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with a (ArcGIS) spatial join between
a 1x1 degree grid and the digitalized map of Murdock Africa map, from Nunn (2009). We exclude all
intersections that measures less than 10 km squared.
Number of Ethnic Group, Murdock (1959)
Number of ethnic groups in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with a (ArcGIS) spatial join between
a 1x1 degree grid and the digitalized map of Murdock map for North and South America, digitalize by
Chiovelli (2013). We exclude all intersections that measures less than 10 km squared.
Malaria Ecology
Average Malaria Ecology Index in the 1x1 degree grid cell. Source: average Malaria Ecology is constructed
as the 1x1 degree cell average of the Malaria Ecology index from Kiszewski (2004) across grids, computed
using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection.
Malaria Endemicity
Average Historical Malaria Endemicity in the 1x1 degree grid cell. Source: average Historical Malaria
Endemicity is constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of the Malaria Endemicity level, devised by
Lysenko (1968) and digitalized by Hay 2004, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL
GRID projection.
Average Temperature
Mean annual 1x1 degree cell temperature (baseline period 1961-1990). Source: average temperature is
constructed as the 1x1 degree cell of the mean annual temperature across raster grids, computed using
ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, from FAO/IIASA, 2011-2012. Global Agro-
ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0). FAO Rome, Italy and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Average Precipitation
Average 1x1 degree cell monthly precipitation mm/month (baseline period 1961-1990). Source: average
monthly precipitation is constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of the mean monthly precipitation
across 10 minute grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, with
CRU CL 2.0 data from New (2002).
Land Suitability
Average land suitability in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: average Land Suitability is constructed as the
1x1 degree cell average of the land suitability index from Ramankutty (2002) across 0.5 degree raster
grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection.
Variation in Land Suitability
Standard deviation of land suitability in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: standard deviation for Land
Suitability is constructed as the 1x1 degree cell standard deviation of the land suitability index from
Ramankutty (2002) across 0.5 degree raster grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL
GRID projection.
Mean Elevation
Average 1x1 degree cell elevation. Source: mean elevation is constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of
elevation across grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in Africa EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, with
data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical
Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.
Variation in Elevation
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Data Construction and Sources: Malaria and Diversity
Standard deviation of elevation in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed as the 1x1 degree cell standard
deviation of elevation across grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in Africa EASE GLOBAL GRID
projection, with data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National
Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.
Ruggedness
Average 1x1 degree cell ruggedness (Terrain Ruggedness Index, 100 m). Source: mean ruggedness is
constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of elevation across grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in
EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, with data from Terrain Ruggedness Index originally devised by Riley,
DeGloria, and Elliot (1999), obtained through http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/grid.
Total Water Area
Total area occupied by water within the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting
the 1x1 degree cell grid and the Digital Chart of the World inwater shapefile, by intersecting the 1x1
degree cell grid and the Digital Chart of the World oceans and sea shapefile. We sum up total in-cell
water area and the areas of the cell occupied by seas and oceans, areas computed with data in EASE
GLOBAL GRID projection.
Total Area
Total area of the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting the 1x1 degree cell
grid and the World Language Mapping System shapefile from the Digital Chart of the World. We exclude
cell parts not covered by World Language Mapping System data (and by the Africa Murdock Map, and
the Murdock map for North and South America), areas computed with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID
projection.
Number of Countries
Total number of countries in the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting the
1x1 degree cell grid and the country boundaries shapefile from the Digital Chart of the World, areas
computed with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection.
Within Country
Dummy variable taking value one if the 1x1 degree cell belong to one single country, 0 otherwise. Source:
constructed with ArcGIS by intersecting the 1x1 degree cell grid and the country boundaries shapefile
from the Digital Chart of the World.
Ln Migratory Distance
Migratory distance, on a land path, from Adis Ababa. Source: computed following ?. The distance of the
centroid of 1x1 degree cell from from Adis Abeba is computed using the Haversine formula. In order to
replicate the most likely migration pattern followed by early men, we calculated the distance from Adis
Ababa of the path that connect several obligatory intermediate points, and namely: Cairo, Istambul,
Phnom Phen, Anadyr and Prince Rupert.
Ln Distance Coast
Distance to closest coast. Source: constructed with ArcGIS using the digital Chart of the World coastline
shapefile.
Ln Distance Border
Distance to closest border. Source: constructed with ArcGIS using the digital Chart of the World
boundaries shapefile.
Ln Distance Capital
Distance to the capital of the country where lies the centroid of the 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed
with ArcGIS using the digital World Capital shapefile.
Ln Distance River
Distance to closest river. Source: constructed with ArcGIS using Major Rivers World selected p3w
shapefile, retrived from www.naturalearth.com.
Absolute Latitude
Absolute latitudinal distance from the equator in decimal degrees of the 1x1 degree cell. Source: computed
using ArcGIS with data in WSG1984.
Night Lights
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Data Construction and Sources: Malaria and Diversity
Average population in 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of pop-
ulation across raster grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection,
with data from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia
University, United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme - FAO, and Centro Internacional de
Agricultura Tropical - CIAT. 2005. Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Pop-
ulation Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC).
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/gpw-v3-population-count.
Ln Population Density
Average night lights intesity in 1x1 degree cell. Source: constructed as the 1x1 degree cell average of
night lights intesity grids, computed using ArcGIS with data in EASE GLOBAL GRID projection, with
data from NOOA National Geophysical Data Centre for the year 2000.
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Data Construction and Sources: Malaria Exposure and and endogamous Marriages
Intra-Ethnic Marriages
Variable equals to one for a marriage between two individuals belonging to the same ethnic group. Zero
otherwise. Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). We create this variable starting from ethnic
variables (v131 for female and mv131 for male for most of the waves) in the DHS. We validate the ethnic
groups using Ethnologue.
Malaria Ecology
Average Malaria Ecology Index in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster. Source:
Malaria Ecology index from Kiszewski (2004).
Malaria Endemicity
Average Historical Malaria Endemicity in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster. Source:
devised by Lysenko (1968) and digitalized by Hay 2004.
Average Temperature
Mean annual temperature in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster (baseline period
1961-1990). Source: FAO/IIASA, 2011-2012. Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0). FAO Rome,
Italy and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Average Precipitation
Average monthly precipitation mm/month in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster
(baseline period 1961-1990). Source: CRU CL 2.0 data from New (2002).
Land Suitability
Average land suitability in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster. Source: Ramankutty
(2002).
Mean Elevation
Average elevation in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster. Source: National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase,
release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.
Variation in Elevation
Standard deviation of elevation in the 10km radius around the coordinates of each cluster. Source:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center,
TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colo.
Urban Residence Female
Dummy variable taking value one the individual is living in urban areas. Zero otherwise. Source:
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (v025 for female and mv025 for male).
Education
Highest year of education of the respondent individual. Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
(v133 for female and mv133 for male).
Age
Age of the respondent individual. Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (vv012 for female and
mv012 for male).
Population in the Relevant Ethnic Aggregation
Absolute number of DHS survey respondent belonging to any given ethnolinguistic family in the region.
Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (v012 for female and mv012 for male).
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